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Article 2

RACE AND THE AMERICAN CITY: THE
KERNER COMMISSION IN RETROSPECTAN INTRODUCTION
JOHN CHARLES BOGER*

During the mid-1960s, powerful social, economic, and political
forces thrust urban issues to the center of national attention, in a context
emphasizing the interrelationship between race, poverty, and urban ills.

One major contributor to this redefinition of American urban problems
was the civil rights movement. The movement, which captured national
attention between 1954 and 1964 by its struggle against segregation in
the South, turned its attention northward, in 1965, toward the "dark

ghettos" of the industrial East and Midwest.1
At almost the same time, national concern over American povertyconcern that largely had abated following World War IHI-began to rekindle, sparked in part by the passionate writings of Michael Harrington 2
and the speeches of the nation's young president, John F. Kennedy.3
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. B.A., Duke
University; M.Div., Yale University; J.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The
author is grateful to Michael Stegman for his wise and learned comments. The author is also
grateful to students Lisa Frye, Charles Reece, Lee Robinson, and Alfred Walker for their
excellent research assistance.
1. See, eg., Martin Luther King, Jr., Next Stop: The North, in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 189-90, 192 (James M.
Washington ed., 1986) ("Mhe Negro freedom movement will be altering its course in the
period to come. Conditions in the North will come into focus and sharpened conflict will
unfold."). Bayard Rustin, a frequent strategist for the movement, explained the necessity for
this redirection northward:
[W]hile school integration proceeds at a snail's pace in the South, the number of
Northern schools with an excessive proportion of minority youth proliferates. And
behind this is the continuing growth of racial slums, spreading over our central cities
and trapping Negro youth in a milieu which, whatever its legal definition, sows an
unimaginable demoralization.
Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Futureof the Civil Rights Movement, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1965, at 25, 26. See generally KENNETH B. CLARK, DARK GHETTO: DILEMMAS
OF SOCIAL POWER (1965) (probing the psychological, social, and economic forces that shape
life in segregated Northern cities).
2.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES

(Penguin Books 1972) (1962).
3. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 251-73 (1986); JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE
AGAINST POVERTY 1900-1985, at 99-114 (enlarged ed. 1986). Patterson noted:
During his campaign for the presidency, [John Kennedy] had been shaken by the
misery he witnessed first hand in West Virginia. In August of that year, speaking on
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Among the many powerful images evoked by Harrington's writings, two
stood out: impoverished, white mining families in rural Appalachia and
desperate African-American 4 families languishing in the nation's central
cities.
[T]here is a new type of slum. Its citizens are the internal migrants, the Negroes, the poor whites from the farms, the Puerto
Ricans. They join the failures from the old ethnic culture and
form an entirely different kind of neighborhood. For many of
them, the crucial problem is color, and this makes the ghetto
walls higher than they have ever been. All of them arrive at a
time of housing shortage..., and thus it is harder to escape

even when income rises. But, above all, these people do not
participate in the culture of aspiration that was the vitality of
the ethnic slum.5
At roughly the same time, prominent sociologists who had long
been studying "juvenile delinquency" began to develop new explanatory
theories that focused less on the moral failings of juveniles and their families and more on the dysfunctionality of urban neighborhoods: 6
Cloward, Ohlin, and Harrington emphasized that juvenile delinquency reflected a broader deterioration in slum conditions.
Their writings, in fact, helped rediscover urban poverty. The
older ethnic slum, they said, had been crowded and unsanitary,
but the people had a vital community life and, most important,
aspirations. . . . [M]ost modem slums were populated by
"dregs" who could not get out and by ill-prepared migrants
from the South, many of whom carried the added burden of
racial discrimination.7
Politically, these intellectual currents emerged at a time when Democratic Party leaders were pondering how best to solidify political allegiance among Southern black migrants who had streamed to Northern
cities after World War II; collectively, these new urban immigrants
promised, by the mid-1960s, to become a crucial political constituency in
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the passage of Social Security, he praised the law for
undertaking a "war on poverty." His inaugural address five months later referred
three times to poverty. "If the free society cannot help the many who are poor," he
said, "it cannot save the few who are rich."
Id. at 126.
4. Editor's Note: The contributors to this Symposium have used the terms "African
American," "black," and "black American," often interchangeably, in their articles. The
North CarolinaLaw Review has elected to defer to its contributors' choices in the absence of
any universally accepted racial or ethnic designation.
5. HARRINGTON, supra note 2, at 143.
6. KATz, supra note 3, at 255-56.
7. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 101.

1993]

THE URBAN CRISIS

1291

key industrial states.8
For different reasons, each of these related developments focused

attention on the cities, especially their African-American poor, among
whom, Daniel Moynihan warned, a "tangle of patholog[ies]" lay largely
unaddressed. 9 In response to this challenge, President Kennedy directed

his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to assemble a task force
charged with developing a coordinated program to alleviate poverty.10
This legislative program, ultimately unveiled after President Kennedy's

assassination in 1963, became a declared "War on Poverty." It was fully
embraced by President Lyndon Johnson as a centerpiece of his Great
Society.11 Principally an urban strategy, the program took direct aim at
8. Piven and Cloward have argued that President Kennedy's need to secure black political support was instrumental in his drive to develop a national urban policy:
The Democratic presidential candidate in 1960 was keenly alert to [black-white tensions in urban areas]. Uncertain that he could resurrect Southern allegiance, Kennedy made a vigorous appeal to the black vote in the industrial states by campaigning
on strong pledges to deal with civil rights and poverty. . . . [T]he ghettoes in a
number of strategic Northern cities delivered overwhelming Democratic majorities,
swinging several critical states to assure his election.... A way had to be found to
prod the local Democratic party machinery to cultivate the allegiance of urban black
voters by extending a greater share of municipal services to them, and to do this
without alienating urban white voters. It was this political imperative that eventually
led the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to intervene in the cities.
FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS
OF PUBLIC WELFARE 255-56 (1971). But see NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND:
THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA 111-35 (1991) (offering a
different account of the Kennedy Administration's motivations); PATTERSON, supra note 3, at
134-36 (arguing that Pivei and Cloward misread the political motivations of the Kennedy
Administration); Hugo Heclo, The PoliticalFoundations of Antdpoverty Policy, in FIGHTING
POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 312, 318-26 (Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel
H. Weinberg eds., 1986) [hereinafter FIGHTING POVERTY] (offering an alternative account of
the genesis of the War on Poverty).
9. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION
29, reprinted in LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND
THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 75 (1967).
10. ALLEN J. MATUSOW, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF LIBERALISM
IN THE 1960s, at 97-127 (1984); PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 127-29, 138-41; James L. Sundquist, Originsof the War on Poverty, in ON FIGHTING POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES FROM EXPERIENCE 6, 8-20 (James L. Sundquist ed., 1969); Adam Yarmolinsky, The Beginnings of OEO,
in ON FIGHTING POVERTY, supra, at 34, 34-50. Several different groups within the White
House were involved in this planning, including the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, Walter Heller. See LEMANN,

supra note 8, at 124-55.
11. Johnson's War on Poverty first was announced in his State of the Union address in
January of 1964. See MATUsow, supra note 10, at 123-24. See generally ROBERT D. PLOTNICK & FELICITY SKIDMORE, PROGRESS AGAINST POVERTY: A REVIEW OF THE 1964-1974
DECADE (1975) (providing the first detailed analysis of the achievements of ten years of public
policy in reducing income poverty); A DECADE OF FEDERAL ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS:
ACHIEVEMENTS, FAILURES, AND LESSONS (Robert H. Haveman ed., 1977) (describing the
creation, aims, and accomplishments of the War of Poverty).
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the racial ghettoes of the nation's cities. 2
In his effort to implement the War on Poverty, President Johnson
commissioned two major, interdisciplinary examinations of housing and
urban policy: the National Commission on Urban Problems (the "Douglas Commission") I3 and the President's Committee on Urban Housing
(the "Kaiser Committee").' When major racial riots tore across the urban landscape during the spring of 1967, President Johnson appointed a
third commission, explicitly to explore the links between racial discrimi-

nation and urban policy: the Kerner Commission.
Twenty-five years have passed since the Kerner Commission issued

its searing indictment of America's urban and racial policies in March of
1968.15 Even had our nation's urban ills and racial problems somehow
abated during the intervening decades, this anniversary would surely invite historical reflection. Yet the problems outlined by the Kerner Commission continue to defy solution by the nation's policymakers; thus, our

twenty-fifth anniversary reflections on the Kerner Commission's work
have keen contemporary significance. As the 1992 Los Angeles rebellion
12. The legislative War on Poverty included passage of: (1) the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the
United States Code); (2) the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89117, 79 Stat. 451 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); (3) the
"Model Cities" program, formally known as the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-754, 80 Stat. 1255 (codified as amended in scattered
titles of the United States Code); and (4) the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in 20 U.S.C. § 236 (1988)).
Ironically, some of the most effective long-term weapons against poverty came not from
the legislation originally designed as central to the "War," but from key components of Johnson's larger Great Society legislation, especially Medicare and Medicaid, inaugurated via the
Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, and the subsequent
expansion of Social Security benefits. See PATrERSON supra note 3, at 157-70; Gary Burtless,
Public Spending on the Poor: Historical Trends and Economic Limits 13-20 (rev. ed. Oct.
1992) (Institute for Research on Poverty Conference Paper, presented at "Poverty and Public
Policy: What Do We Know? What Should We Do?", Madison, Wisconsin, May 28-30, 1992).
13. The Douglas Commission, chaired by Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, drew its membership from the nation's leading political and academic ranks. President Johnson charged it
with developing plans to improve the quality of American cities. National Housing Goals:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 285-364 (1969) (statement of Hon. Paul H. Douglas, Chairman, National
Commission on Urban Problems, accompanied by Walter Dybeck, Acting Director, National
Commission on Urban Problems).
14. The Kaiser Committee, headed by industrialist Edgar F. Kaiser, was appointed on
June 2, 1967, and included a wide spectrum of business and labor leaders. The Committee
made interim suggestions to the Administration during the consideration by Congress of what
became the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, and it submitted a final report to
President Johnson on December 11, 1968. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN
HOUSING, A DECENT HOME i-ii
(1968).

15.

REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS (Bantam

1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMM'N REPORT].

Books
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emphasized,16 millions of the urban poor still find themselves without
decent employment, adequate education, affordable health care and
housing, or social welfare programs that meet their basic needs. Moreover, the black-white racial divisions that dominated the Kerner Commission's vision of urban life in 1968 remain sharp, although they have
been complicated by the emergence of other ethnic groups, such as Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, Latinos from Central and South
America, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Thais, and Koreans, whose legitimate claims for participation in urban life make political, social, and economic relationships even more challenging.17
Meanwhile, in 1993 America's cities face grave, burgeoning social
ills, many of them closely intertwined with race and ethnicity: a decline
in manufacturing and other blue-collar jobs, inadequate public schools,
an explosion of gang- and drug-related violence and crime among the

young, the AIDS epidemic and other looming public health challenges,
an increasingly impoverished citizenry, and private disinvestment in urban projects. Many urban mayors today find themselves with less money
than in 1968 and fewer clear ideas about what can be done to address
these overwhelming problems.
To be sure, the urban scene has changed significantly since 1968,
and in some respects, as we will document below, conditions have improved. Yet the principaltheme of this Introductionis that thefundamental social and economic diagnoses of the Kerner Commission remain
pertinent twenty-five years later, while its policy prescriptions remain
largely ignored. Whether the Kerner Commission was correct, and, if so,
whether the policies proposed in 1968 have continuing relevance for the
16. See generally James H. Johnson, Jr. et al., The Los Angeles Rebellion: A Retrospective
View, 6 ECON. DEv. Q. 356, 356-70 (1992) (concluding that the riots "reflected the high degree
of frustration and alienation that had built up among the citizens of south central Los Angeles
over the past 20 years").
17. See generally Nancy A. Denton & Douglas S. Massey, PatternsofNeighborhood Transition in a Multiethnic World: U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1970-1980, 28 DEMOGRAPHY 41, 4161 (1991) (analyzing changes in the ethnic composition of urban neighborhoods inhabited by
whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians); Gary D. Sandefur, Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, and Poverty-andWhat Worked, in QUIET RIOTS, RACE AND POVERTY INTHE UNITED
STATES: THE KERNER REPORT TWENTY YEARS LATER 46, 46-74 (Fred R. Harris & Roger

W. Wilkins eds., 1988) [hereinafter QUIET RIOTS] (surveying the economic, educational, and
social status of whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans in light of the findings and
recommendations of the Kerner Report); Marta Tienda & Leif Jensen, Poverty and Minorities:
A Quarter-CenturyProfile of Color and Socioeconomic Disadvantage,in DIVIDED OPPORTUNITIES: MINORITIES, POVERTY, AND SOCIAL POLICY 23, 23-61 (Gary D. Sandefur & Marta
Tienda eds., 1988) [hereinafter DIVIDED OPPORTUNITIES] (examining changes in average income, employment status, and poverty among blacks, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans,
other Native Americans, and non-Hispanic whites between 1959 and 1984).
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nation in 1993, are fundamental questions that the contributors to this
special issue must address in the pages to follow.

In this Introduction, we will undertake two preliminary tasks: first,
to review the Kerner Commission's principal findings and recommendations; and second, to provide readers with a statistical account of the
altered circumstances that face African Americans and America's cities
in 1993. With these data in mind, readers can move on to the essays of
the special contributors, probing their ideas, asking what policy prescrip18
tions appear most promising for the decades to come.
I.

THE URBAN CRISIS OF THE MID-1960S AND THE KERNER
CoMMIsSIoN REPORT

During the mid-1960s, the nation witnessed five consecutive summers of mounting racial unrest in its cities.19 Following especially deadly
and destructive riots during the spring and early summer of 1967, Presi18. Important recent studies that have reexamined the principal issues addressed by the
Kerner Commission include: REYNOLDS FARLEY & WALTER R. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE
AND THE QUALITY

OF LIFE IN AMERICA

(1987) [hereinafter COLOR LINE]; THE METROPOLIS

IN BLACK & WHITE: PLACE, POWER AND POLARIZATION

(George C. Galster & Edward W.

Hill eds., 1992) [hereinafter BLACK AND WHITE]; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams,
Jr. eds., 1989) [hereinafter COMMON DESTINY]; QUIET RIOTS, supra note 17; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1987) [hereinafter TRULY DISADVANTAGED]; James A. Kushner, Apartheid

in America: An Historicaland Legal Analysis of ContemporaryRacial ResidentialSegregation
in the United States, 22 How. L.J. 547 (1979); William L. Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection,
and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700 (1986).
19. The Kerner Commission traced the inception of the disturbances to 1963, when urban
disorders broke out in Birmingham, Savannah, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Cambridge, Maryland. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at 35. The number and magnitude of racial
disturbances increased in each succeeding year until 1967, when major rioting broke out in
Newark, New Jersey, Detroit, Michigan, and 162 other American cities. Id. at 35-108.
The riots followed a decade of mounting white violence targeted at blacks who were involved in efforts to end legal segregation. During the decade between 1954 and 1964, numerous blacks had been killed in the civil rights struggle. See generally THE CIVIL RIGHTS EDUC.
PROJECT, THE SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CTR, FREE AT LAST: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THOSE WHO DIED IN THE STRUGGLE (1989) (profiling 40 people

who died in the civil rights movement). In 1963 and 1964 alone, at least 70 black churches
were burned or bombed. DANIEL S. DAVIS, STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM: THE HISTORY OF

BLACK AMERICANS 224 (1972); 2 THE AMERICAN NEGRO REFERENCE BOOK 451 (John P.
Davis ed., 1966). See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE

KING YEARS 1954-63, at 412-523 (1988) (describing the violence and official intimidation that
met the Freedom Riders of 1961, second the voter registration efforts by Robert Moses and the
Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee in Mississippi); HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS

RESTED (1977) (offering reminiscences from front-line civil rights workers about the violence,
hostility, and official repression they encountered during the civil rights struggles of the 1950s
and 1960s); JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 19541965 (1987) (picturing the fierce, deadly resistance by white citizens and officials in Alabama
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dent Johnson issued Executive Order No. 11,365,20 creating a National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. The President charged the

Commission to investigate "[t]he origins of the recent major civil disorders in our cities, includ[ing] the basic causes and factors leading to such
disorders," and to propose "methods and techniques for averting or controlling such disorders," including "[t]he appropriate role of the local,
'2 1
state and Federal authorities.

Nine months later, in March of 1968-twenty-five years ago-the

Commission, chaired by then-Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois, delivered its comprehensive report to the American nation. The report began
with a memorable warning:

This is our basic conclusion: Our nation is moving toward
two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal.
Reaction to last summer's disorders has quickened the
movement and deepened the division. Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much of American life; they now
threaten the future of every American.
This deepening racial division is not inevitable. The move-

ment apart can be reversed. Choice is still possible. Our principal task is to define that choice and to press for a national
resolution.
To pursue our present course will involve the continuing
and Mississippi to efforts by the SNCC, the SCLC, and other civil rights groups pressing for an
end to segregation).
The riots of the 1960s were far from the first interracial disturbances to threaten American cities. Prior to the Civil War, there were clashes in Northern cities precipitated by various
factors, including white resentment of African-American workers and white desire to maintain
economic and political dominance. See, eg., LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE
NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860, at 100-02, 165-68 (1961). In the decades following
Emancipation, outbreaks of interracial violence erupted episodically, many characterized by
widespread white violence against black lives and property. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 425-44 (1988) (recounting Ku Klux Klan violence against African Americans during Reconstruction); JOHN
HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEGROES 336

(1947) (discussing Wilmington riot of 1898); id. at 431-36 (describing riots by whites in early
20th century); id. at 467 (noting that lynchings and riots took 136 black lives in 1917-1918,
with 40 murdered by whites in East St. Louis); id. at 472-75 (describing riots against blacks in
1919); id. at 578 (discussing Detroit riot of 1943); 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 566-69 (1944) (summarizing the
history of riots against African Americans in the United States); ARTHUR I. WASKow, FROM
RACE RIOT TO Srr-IN, 1919 AND THE 1960s: A STUDY IN THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN
CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE 1-218 (Anchor Books 1967) (1966) (examining the riots against
blacks in 1919).
20. Executive Order No. 11,365, reprintedin KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15,
app. A, at 534.
21. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, app. A, at 534.
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polarization of the American community and, ultimately, the
destruction of basic democratic values.22
At first glance, the Kerner Commission's warning of a "deepening
racial division" seemed to point backwards, toward a pattern as old as
American history. From colonial times, America's white majority had
insisted upon, and legally enforced, the separate and unequal status of
blacks.23 The Constitution itself implicitly recognized chattel slavery,24
ensuring the growth of a nation "half slave and half free."2 Prior to
1861 most free blacks endured intense social segregation and legally enforced discrimination, even in the nonslaveholding areas outside the
South. 26 The Civil War ended chattel slavery as an institution but
brought no real end to the legal subordination of blacks. Instead, shortly
after the nation adopted the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, national political and judicial leaders repudiated their experiment in racial
equality, acquiesced in renewed racial discrimination, and collaborated
to guarantee black political disenfranchisement.2 7 The white majority, in
effect, chose to shape twentieth-century American life and law in the image of Jim Crow.28
Yet the Kerner Commission Report, in retelling this tragic history,2 9
made clear that its alarm proceeded not merely from the continuance of
22. Id. at 1.
23. See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND

THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1978) (assessing the legal treatment of blacks in colonial
America); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 44-135 (1968) (discussing enslavement of blacks in America prior
to 1700).
24. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITCS 26-27 (1978).

25. The image of America's racially divided house comes, of course, from Abraham Lincoln's second-most-famous address. Abraham Lincoln, Speech Before the Republican State
Convention in Springfield, Ill.
(June 16, 1858), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 426 (Library of America ed., 1989).
26. See generally LITWACK, supra note 19, at vii-xi (describing how free blacks were often
residentially segregated, denied access to schools, restricted to menial employments, denied the
vote, and required to post bond for good behavior when entering many states).
27. See W.E.B. Du BoIs, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 670-710 (Meridian
Books 1962) (1935); FONER, supra note 19, at 524-601; JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 152-227 (1961); C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND

REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION passim (1951);

see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542-53 (1896) (establishing the "separate but equal"
doctrine); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3-26 (1883) (declaring unconstitutional the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, which protected blacks' rights to accommodations and privileges).
28. CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 181-222 (1940);
JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION 224-395 (1984); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE

CAREER OF JIM CROW 3-67 (2d ed. 1974).

29. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at 206-35.
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America's old racial divisions, but from a dangerous new form of separation unfolding in the mid-1960s that would "threaten the future of every
American." To some observers, the Commission appeared to be drawing

precisely the wrong conclusion about trends in America's racial relations. Following centuries of oppression, African Americans in the mid1960s appeared finally poised to achieve the equal rights denied them for

350 years. After decades of patient planning and struggle, 3° NAACP
lawyers persuaded the Supreme Court in 1954 to repudiate Jim Crow
finally.31 The Warren Court subsequently presided over a remarkable

campaign to restore the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as guar-

32
antors of equal rights for black citizens.
Moreover, a decade of direct political activity organized by the

Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Congress of Racial
Equality, the NAACP, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 33 finally prompted Congress in 1964 and 1965 to enact the two

most sweeping civil rights statutes ever written into American law: the
Civil Rights Act of 196434 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 35 Together, these statutes were designed to end racial discrimination in public
education, employment, voting, and governmental programs. Surely, observers reasoned, the promising developments from 1954 to 1965 spelled
30. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976) (detailing the legal campaign that led to Brown v. Board of Education); GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK:
CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983) (examining
Houston's role in the civil rights movement); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (discussing NAACP's cam-

paign against segregated schools).
31. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
32. See, eg., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2-13 (1967) (striking Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-81 (1967) (striking California constitutional provision that protected private acts of racial discrimination in realty transactions);
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1965) (striking Louisiana's literacy tests for
prospective voters); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342-45 (1960) (condemning racially
gerrymandered voting boundaries); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4-20 (1958) (insisting on
state and local compliance with school desegregation decrees); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 460-61 (1958) (protecting the First Amendment association rights of Alabama's NAACP
against state interference).
33. See generallyBRANCH, supra note 19 (recounting the campaigns for civil rights undertaken by Dr. Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference);
CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960s
(1981) (discussing the role played by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in the
civil rights movement); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984) (examining the origins of

the civil rights movement and the role of the "black masses").
34. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1988); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a-h(6) (1988)).
35. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973a-p, & 1973aadd6 (1988)).
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the end of America's history of racial division. Surely the nation was
moving forward, not backward.3 6
Yet the Kerner Commission's verdict was strongly to the contrary.
Neither Brown v. Board of Education, nor the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
nor the victories of Dr. King, nor any of the hard-won accomplishments
of the Second Civil Rights Revolution would suffice to heal America's
racial wounds. Instead, the Commission implied, the riots were clear
proof that antidiscrimination laws alone could never fully redress the
residual injuries of slavery and segregation. Ironically, after a decade of
remarkable achievements in court and Congress, America faced a racial
divide more profound than any in its segregated past.3"
A.

The Kerner Commission's Vision of the Future

The Commission's stem analysis began with a description of two
related social movements, each set in motion during the early 1900s, that
had gathered force steadily after World War II. The first was the migration of African Americans from the rural South to the urban North; the
second was the departure of urban whites from Northern cities to suburban enclaves. According to the Report, the resulting residential separation was virtually absolute:
" Almost all Negro population growth (98 percent from 1950
to 1966) is occurring within metropolitan areas, primarily
within central cities.
" The vast majority of white population growth (78 percent
from 1960 to 1966) is occurring in suburban portions of
metropolitan areas. Since 1960, white central-city population has declined by 1.3 million.
" As a result, central cities are becoming more heavily Negro
while the suburban fringes around them remain almost entirely white.3 8
These demographic shifts, the Commission observed, were not the
product of private choice or other race-neutral explanations. "What
white Americans have never fully understood-but what the Negro can
never forget-is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto.
36. As Erol Ricketts has observed, the civil rights gains of the 1960s led many scholars,
for a time, to discount the continuing significance of racial discrimination in American life.
Erol Ricketts, The Underclass: Causes and Responses, in BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 18,
at 216, 224-25.
37. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at 234-36.
38. Id. at 12-13. In Chapter Six of the Report, entitled, "The Formation of the Racial
Ghettos," the Commission set forth evidence of the changing urban demography since 1900.
Id. at 236-47.
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White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white

society condones it."39
In a series of point-by-point forecasts, the Commission urged that
these developments, if left unchecked, would undercut the positive effects
of the Civil Rights Act and the judicial decrees of the Warren Court.
First, the Commission reasoned, accelerating residential segregation
would frustrate black efforts to secure equal employment," since "[m]ost
new employment opportunities... are being created in suburbs and outlying areas-and this trend is likely to continue indefinitely." 4 The exclusion of blacks from this emerging suburban work force would be
catastrophic; black unemployment (and underemployment) would become "the single most important source of poverty among Negroes,"'42
and a principal source of family and social disorganization as well:
Wives of these men are forced to work, and usually produce
more money. If men stay at home without working, their inadequacies constantly confront them and tensions arise between
them and their wives and children. Under these pressures, it is
not surprising that many of these men flee their responsibilities
as husbands and fathers, leaving home, and drifting from city
to city, or adopting the style of "street corner men.""
The adverse effects of the developing urban/suburban "mismatch"
between jobs and minority workers, the Commission forewarned, would
extend beyond individual family circles. Residents of central cities, increasingly low-paid or unemployed African Americans and other ethnic
minorities, would experience-indeed, already were experiencing-the
44
interrelated social effects of concentrated poverty: high rates of crime,

inadequate health care, 45 inadequate sanitation, 46 and exploitative retail
services.47
The Commission added that this concentrated poverty would seriously limit the educational prospects of urban children:
When disadvantaged children are racially isolated in the
schools, they are deprived of one of the more significant ingredients of quality education: exposure to other children with
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 251-65.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 260.
See id. at 266-69.
See id. at 269-73.
Id.
Id. at 274-77.
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strong educational backgrounds. The Coleman Report and the
Report of the Civil Rights Commission establish that the predominant socio-economic background of the students in a
school exerts a powerful impact upon achievement....
Another strong influence on achievement derives from the
tendency of school administrators, teachers, parents and the
students themselves to regard ghetto schools as inferior. Reflecting this attitude, students attending such schools lose confidence in their ability to shape their future. The Coleman
Report found this factor-destiny control-"to have a stronger
relationship to achievement than . . . all the [other] 'school'
factors together" .... 41
The Commission foresaw decreased housing opportunities for urban
minorities, flowing from the increased racial isolation. While inadequate
housing was not a problem faced solely by urban blacks,4 9 the Commission nonetheless contended that African Americans, because of their
higher relative rates of poverty and the pervasive discrimination they
faced in the broader urban housing market, would experience the adverse
effects of poor housing disproportionately."0
Discrimination prevents access to many nonslum areas, particularly the suburbs, and has a detrimental effect on ghetto housing itself. By restricting the area open to a growing population,
housing discrimination makes it profitable for landlords to
break up ghetto apartments for denser occupancy, hastening

housing deterioration. By creating a "back pressure" in the racial ghettos, discrimination keeps prices and rents of older,
more deteriorated housing in the ghetto higher than they would
be in a truly free and open market. 5'
Having catalogued the adverse effects on individual citizens, the
Kerner Commission next examined the cumulative effect of urban racial
isolation on the financial health of the nation's cities:
As a result of the population shifts of the post-war period,
concentrating the more affluent parts of the urban population
in residential suburbs while leaving the less affluent in the central cities, the increasing burden of municipal taxes frequently
48. Id. at 427 (citing JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 23 (1966)). Similar forecasts had
been made by the United States Commission on Civil Rights in an important 1967 report. See
Racial Isolation and the Outcomes of Education, in RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS:

A

REPORT

72-124 (1967).

49. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at 467-68. "Nationally, over 4 million of
the nearly 6 million occupied substandard units in 1966 were occupied by whites." Id. at 468.
50. Id. at 473.
51. Id.
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falls upon that part of the urban population least able to pay
them.
Increasing concentrations of urban growth have called
forth greater expenditures for every kind of public service: education, health, police protection, fire protection, parks, sewage
disposal, sanitation, water supply, etc. These expenditures have

strikingly outpaced tax revenues.5 2
The Commission found little consolation in the likelihood that African Americans soon would gain political power in urban centers. Black
mayors and city councils, the Commission reasoned, would lack both the
will and the capacity to increase taxes sufficiently on already
overburdened city taxpayers. 3 Nor did additional sources of municipal
revenues seem promising. Private industry was unlikely to make investments in the racial ghetto; the Commission observed that "[t]he withdrawal of private capital is already far advanced in most all-Negro areas
of our large cities," and that "[e]ven if private investment continued, it
alone would not suffice." 5 4 Only the federal government could command
sufficient financial resources to step into the financial breach. Yet by the
time African Americans would come to power in urban centers,
it is probable that Congress will be more heavily influenced by
representatives of the suburban and outlying city electorate.
These areas will comprise 41 percent of our total population by
1985, compared with 33 percent in 1960. Central cities will
decline from 31 percent to 27 percent. Without decisive action
toward integration, this influential suburban electorate would
be over 95 percent white and much more affluent than the central city population. 5
The Commission specifically addressed the crucial role played by
the national media in shaping the nation's racial 7and urban understanding.6 It faulted the media, less for riot coverage than for their broader
of civil disfailure "to report adequately on the causes and consequences
orders and the underlying problems of race relations." 5 8
52. Id. at 393.
53. Id. at 399-400.
54. Id. at 399.
55. Id. at 400.
56. Chapter 15 is titled "The News Media and the Disorders." Id. at 362-89.
57. The Report found that "despite incidents of sensationalism, inaccuracies, and distortions, [the media] ... on the whole made a real effort to give a balanced, factual account of the
1967 disorders." Id. at 363. Nonetheless, the Commission concluded that the coverage "failed
to reflect accurately [the] ... scale and character" of the disorders, leading to "an exaggeration
of both mood and event." Id.
58. Id. The Commission later elaborated upon this criticism:
[T]he news media have failed to analyze and report adequately on racial problems in
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The Kerner Commission's Prescriptionsfor NationalAction
The Kerner Commission insisted that these accelerating trends to-

ward racial isolation required an immediate, comprehensive, national response. Only three basic strategies were possible. The nation could
adopt a so-called "Present Policies Choice" that maintained the current

allocation of resources to urban areas and the poor. 9 Alternatively, it
could pursue an "Enrichment Choice" that would "offset the effects of

continued Negro segregation" with programs designed to improve the
quality of life in disadvantaged central-city neighborhoods, a choice that

"would require marked increases in federal spending for education, housing, employment, job training, and social services." 60 Finally, the nation
could exercise an "Integration Choice," "aimed at reversing the move-

ment of the country toward two societies, separate and unequal."'" This
choice would provide strong incentives for African Americans to leave
central-city residences, enlarging their choices in housing, employment,
and education. It would also require large-scale public investments, on
an interim basis, in the quality of central-city life for those residents who
chose to remain behind.62

Having sketched out the alternatives, the Commission urged the nation to make the Integration Choice. It expressed grave doubts about the
underlying assumptions of an Enrichment Choice strategy:
In the end,... its premise is that disadvantaged Negroes can

achieve equality of opportunity with whites while continuing in
conditions of nearly complete separation.
This premise has been vigorously advocated by Black
Power proponents ....

the United States and, as a related matter, to meet the Negro's legitimate expectations in journalism. By and large, news organizations have failed to communicate to
both their black and white audiences a sense of the problems America faces and the
sources of potential solutions. The media report and write from the standpoint of a
white man's world. The ills of the ghetto, the difficulties of life there, the Negro's
burning sense of grievance, are seldom conveyed. Slights and indignities are part of
the Negro's daily life, and many of them come from what he now calls "the white
press"-a press that repeatedly, if unconsciously, reflects the biases, the paternalism,
the indifference of white America. This may be understandable, but it is not excusable in an institution that has the mission to inform and educate the whole of our
society.
Id. at 366.
59. Id. at 395.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 396.
62. Id.
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This argument is understandable, but there is a great deal
of evidence that it is unrealistic.
The economy of the United States and particularly the
sources of employment are preponderantly white. In this circumstance, a policy of separate but equal employment could
only relegate Negroes permanently to inferior incomes and economic status.6 3
The Commission reserved even harsher judgment for the Present
Policies Choice. Of the three, it declared, "the Present Policies Choicethe choice we are now making [by default]-is the course with the most
ominous consequences for our society." 64 Because current social and
policy efforts could not adequately address the employment, educational,
and other needs of central-city residents, the Commission warned, to
continue along that course would risk heightened anger and renewed violence, especially among despairing, inner-city youth: "If large-scale violence resulted, white retaliation could follow. This spiral could quite
conceivably lead to a kind of urban apartheid with semi-martial law in
many major cities, enforced residence of Negroes in segregated areas, and
a drastic reduction in personal freedom for all Americans, particularly
65
Negroes.",
Even if widespread violence were averted, the Commission argued
that Present Policies Choice would lead almost certainly to increased racial isolation and polarization, unless millions of African Americans

were somehow to achieve rapid income advances, or there occurred a
"migration of a growing Negro middle class out of the central city...
[which] might diminish the racial undertones of... th[e] competition for

federal funds between central cities and outlying areas." 66
In casting its institutional weight behind the Integration Choice, the

Commission insisted that this choice was: (1) responsive to the expected
job growth in the suburbs, (2) compelled by evidence that "socio-class

integration is the most effective way of improving the education of ghetto
children," (3) best adapted to create an adequate housing supply for poor
and moderate income citizens, and (4) most faithful to American political and social ideals.67

Many of the Commission's specific policy recommendations to implement this strategy, however, actually focused upon programs directed
toward inner-city improvements. The Commission proposed, for exam63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 404.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 406-07.
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pie, to improve employment prospects by (1) consolidating urban employment efforts, (2) increasing manpower and job training efforts in
urban areas, (3) taking aggressive action against those employment practices with a racially discriminatory intent or effect, (4) providing tax
credits to spur investment in rural as well as urban poverty areas, and (5)
beginning "immediate action to create 2,000,000 new jobs over the next
three years-one million in the public sector and one million in the private sector."68 None of these employment proposals directly confronted
the problem of residential segregation.
In the public education area, while the Commission supported general efforts to "reduce de facto segregation in our schools," especially the
"racial discrimination in Northern as well as Southern schools,"'69 it
stopped short of calling for mandatory, inter-district school desegregation. 70 Instead, most of its recommendations targeted inner-city schools
and children for compensatory or supplemental aid.71
Only in the housing area did the Commission prescribe solutions
tailored to address the urban/suburban racial segregation central to its
analysis of the underlying problem. The Commission's suburban housing strategy was twofold. First, it called for "a comprehensive and enforceable federal open housing law to cover the sale or rental of all
housing, including single family homes."'72 To implement the law, the
Commission urged "voluntary community action" to disseminate information about suburban housing opportunities to urban minorities and to
provide education in suburban communities about "the desirability of
open housing."'73 Second, the Commission urged an expansion of federal
housing programs that would target more low- and moderate-income
units in suburban areas, adding six million units to the federal low-income housing inventory within five years.74
68. Id. at 24, 413-24.
69. Id. at 25-26.
70. The Commission's proposed approach relied upon (1) voluntary desegregation induced by increased federal financial and technical aid to those local school districts that undertook desegregation projects, and (2) strict enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 against districts engaged in illegal discrimination. Id. at 438-44.
71. Id. at 26, 445-55.
72. Id. at 28. The Commission reported that it had "canvassed the various alternatives,
and ha[d] come to the firm opinion that there is no substitute for enactment of a federal fair
housing law. The key to breaking down housing discrimination is universal and uniform coverage, and such coverage is obtainable only through federal legislation." Id. at 481.
73. Id. at 481.
74. Id. at 474-82. This policy was echoed by the Kaiser Committee, which also called for
the development of six million new, federally subsidized housing units by 1973. REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, supra note 14, at 216.
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C. The National Response to the Kerner Commission Report

The Kerner Commission warned America that it must choose
among three mutually exclusive policy alternatives. Yet within a month
after the Commission issued its report, President Johnson renounced a

second Presidential term,7" and later in 1968, Republican candidate
Richard Nixon narrowly defeated the Democratic presidential candidate,
Vice President Hubert Humphrey. During the succeeding eight years,
the urban and poverty programs crafted by President Johnson's Admin-

istration-the War on Poverty and the Model Cities Program-gradually lost executive and legislative momentum.76
It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that the nation took no
additional steps to address the social ills of segregation and isolated urban poverty. Prior to the 1968 Presidential election, Congress passed
two major pieces of housing legislation, both of which were prompted in

part by the riots and the themes of the Kerner Commission Report. One
was the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 77 which Congress hastily had appended to other civil rights legislation designed to protect citizens exercising their civil rights from violence or intimidation.7 8 Under the Fair
75. Tom Wicker, President Steps Aside in Unity Bid-Says "House" is Divided, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1968, at 1; see also President Lyndon Johnson, Address of Mar. 31, 1968, in
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1968, at 26 (outlining president's policies on Vietnam War and his political plans).
76. Gary Orfield has characterized the national political response as a near-total rejection
of the basic Kerner prescriptions:
With the election of Nixon and Reagan, whose administrations have set the basic
social-policy agenda for the last twenty years, the country rejected the fundamental
conclusions and recommendations of the Kerner Report. The issue of civil rights
disappeared from national politics, and the idea that there was something fundamentally wrong with existing racial conditions, something that required strong governmental action, was rejected ....
Presidential politics polarized on racial grounds,
with four of the five elections since the Kerner Report won by the candidate who
received virtually no black votes.
Gary Orfield, Separate Societies: Have the Kerner Warnings Come True?, in QUIET RIOTS,
supra note 17, at 101. For other accounts of policy currents during this period, see HENRY J.
AARON, POLITICS AND THE PROFESSORS: THE GREAT SOCIETY IN PERSPECTIVE passim
(1978); SAR A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY'S POOR LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO POVERTY passim (1969); DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING:
COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE WAR AGAINST POVERTY 21-101 (1969); CHARLES MURRAY,

LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980, at 56-146 (1984); PIVEN &
CLOWARD, supra note 8, at 248-348; ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, HOUSING THE POOR: THE

CASE FOR HEROISM 31-93 (1978).
77. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619
(1988)).
78. See S. REP. No. 721, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1837, 1838. The Act was passed following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King on
April 4, 1968. As Richard H. Sander recounts the legislative history:
In 1965, President Johnson sent... [a comprehensive federal bill banning housing
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Housing Act, it became "the policy of the United States to provide

within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States." 79 The Act expressly prohibited racial or religious discrimination
by governmental or most private owners of multi-family housing8" in the

83
82
sale or rental of dwellings,8" or in their advertisement, their financing,
or their commercial brokerage. 84
The Fair Housing Act also required HUD and other federal agen-

cies to "administer their programs and activities relating to housing and
urban development ... affirmatively to further the purposes" of fair
housing." Yet the Act provided very few federal tools to compel private

compliance. Instead, it placed principal responsibility on the shoulders
of aggrieved private homeseekers, who were authorized to file administrative complaints of housing discrimination with HUD and to initiate

federal lawsuits if HUD failed to obtain "voluntary compliance" within
thirty days.8 6 Apart from their conciliation responsibilities,87 however,

federal authorities were given meaningful enforcement powers only if
"the Attorney General ha[d] reasonable cause to believe that any person
...

is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance," and if "such denial

'
raise[d] an issue of general public importance. 88

Congress also enacted a second piece of responsive federal legislation, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.89 This legisladiscrimination] to Congress, but after passing the House in 1966, the bill died in the
Senate. Senate liberals introduced a still stronger bill in 1967; after a long filibuster
battle and some concessions that won moderate votes, the Senate passed the bill in
March 1968. The House approved the Senate version in the tense days following the
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.
Richard H. Sander, Comment: IndividualRights and DemographicRealities: The Problem of
FairHousing, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 874, 880 (1988). See generally Jean Eberhart Dubofsky,
FairHousing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 149-63 (1969)
(chronicling congressional debates on the Fair Housing Act).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988).
80. Id. § 3604. The Act provided an exemption for "any single-family house sold or
rented by an owner," without benefit of brokerage services or advertisements, id. § 3603(b)(1),
and for small, owner-occupied rooming houses. Id. § 3603(b)(2). This exemption affected approximately 20% of the private housing market. 2 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESS AND THE NATION 1965-1968, at 378, 386 (1969).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
82. Id. § 3604(c).
83. Id. § 3605.
84. Id. § 3607.
85. Id. § 3608(d).
86. Id. §§ 3610(a), 3613(a)(2).
87. Id. §§ 3608-3609.
88. Id. § 3614.
89. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
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tion created programs to spur low-income housing construction,
including: (1) interest subsidies for low- and moderate-income homeownership, 90 (2) a new program to subsidize interest rates for developers
who would agree to build and lease dwelling units for low-income persons, 91 (3) additional funding to increase public housing production by
375,000 units over the 1968-1970 period, 92 and (4) numerous urban renewal modifications. Three years later, HUD promulgated regulations
that were designed to channel low-income housing subsidies toward suburban jurisdictions, 93 and in 1974, Congress passed additional housing
legislation that appeared on its face even more far-reaching and directly
responsive to the concerns of the Kerner Commission. The Housing and
Community Development Act of 197491 (HCDA) declared that it was
aimed at "the elimination of slums and blight.., and the deterioration of
property and neighborhood and community facilities of importance to
the welfare of the community, principally persons of low and moderate
income." 95
The HCDA promised "the reduction of the isolation of income
groups within communities and geographical areas and the promotion of
an increase in the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods through the
spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for persons of lower income and the revitalization of deteriorating or deteriorated neighborhoods." 96 Yet the HCDA proved, in practice, to be unfaithful to the
lofty assurances of its preamble, operating most often to undermine the
U.S.C., 40 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). The House report on the bill began by underscoring the
relationship between poverty, urban unrest, and the proposed legislation:
A basic factor in the magnitude and urgency of our present housing problems has
been the failure to include all parts of our population in the general rise in incomes
and wealth. In fact this growth of prosperity has accentuated and may have even
widened the gap between the poverty of the approximately 6 million families who
still live in substandard housing and the affluent majority. Because of this contrast
and the unrest it has created, the task of our housing and urban development programs is more critical than ever.
H.R. REP. No. 1585, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2873,
2873-74.

This legislation borrowed heavily from the developing recommendations of the Kaiser
Commission. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, supra
note 14, at 216-22.
90. H.R. REP. No. 1585, supra note 89, at 6-11, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 287883.
91. See id. at 21-27, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2893-99.
92. Id. at 27, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2899.
93. 24 C.F.R. § 200.710 (1992); see 24 C.F.R. § 880.201-.207 (1992).
94. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
96. Id. § 5301(c)(6).
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real needs of the poor.9 7 Like the Model Cities legislation that preceded
it,98 the HCDA's Kerner-inspired goals of racial and economic deconcentration were thwarted by powerful political opposition. Furthermore,
the HCDA's insistence on "spatial deconcentration" of low-income
housing soon led to ironic consequences. As John Calmore noted at the

time:
97. The 1974 Act abandoned narrowly tailored categorical grants in favor of broad, community development "block grants" (CDBGs) that allowed local authorities to pursue locally
developed priorities. In this way, the Act subordinated the needs of the poor, who were usually politically powerless, to the desires of local political leaders. Although the HCDA formally required each community to develop a Housing Assistance Plan (HAP) that would
address likely future housing needs, id. § 5304(a)(1), (c), HUD was granted no substantive
power to reject a local plan or to withhold CDBG funds unless the locality's description of
local needs and objectives was "plainly inconsistent" with available local data, or unless the
proposed use of the block grant funds was deemed "plainly inappropriate" to meet the locality's announced goals. Id. § 5304(c). Likewise, although HCDA formally provided a mechanism for citizen input, the Act required nothing more than provision of information and a
public hearing to obtain community views. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(2) (1988). There was neither
citizen veto power nor any other meaningful source of citizen resistance to a locality's decision.
Id.; Herbert Franklin et al., Inclusionary Programsand the LargerPublic Interest, in AFTER
MOUNT LAUREL: THE NEW SUBURBAN ZONING 299, 307-15 (Jerome G. Rose & Robert E.
Rothman eds., 1977).
HCDA formally required each locality to give "maximum feasible priority" to activities
that would benefit low- and moderate-income persons. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(3). The requirement was widely ignored. Indeed, after 1981, localities no longer were required even to file
their revised HAP plans when applying for additional CDBG funds. See Pub. L. No. 97-35,
95 Stat. 384, 384-86. During the Reagan years, the needs of lower income persons were thus
given even less consideration by many local communities.
98. The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-754, 80 Stat. 1255 (repealed 1975), was designed as a national competition in which cities
were invited to submit their most innovative proposals to provide and improve low- and moderate-income housing as well as educational and social services to the urban poor. The winning submissions would receive federal grants to implement their proposals. As originally
conceived, however, the Act was more than an urban aid bill; it contained strong antidiscrimination and desegregation components, including provisions requiring the appointment of
a federal coordinator for each funded city to ensure compliance with federal civil rights laws
and to facilitate cooperation with federal antipoverty agencies. These provisions were stripped
from the bill prior to passage because of stiff opposition from Republicans and southern Democrats.
Although the Model Cities program was meant to encourage cooperation between federal
and municipal officials to achieve its goals, once the strong antidiscrimination provisions were
eliminated and it became clear that most grant requirements would be generously interpreted,
the program became pork barrel politics par excellence. Municipalities were granted virtually
free reign in allocating the substantial amounts of federal largesse provided by the program.
See generally Phyllis A. Wallace, A Decade of Policy Developments in Equal Opportunities in
Employment and Housing, in A DECADE OF FEDERAL ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS: ACHIEVE-

MENTS, FAILURES, AND LESSONS 351-52 (Robert H. Haveman ed., 1977) (emphasizing that
the federally assisted housing programs of the 1960s were "extremely costly," benefited "only a
small percentage of eligible low- and moderate-income families," and were plagued by "widely
publicized scandals"); MARGARET WEIR ET AL., THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE

UNITED STATES 337-38 (1988).
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In the name of expanding housing opportunities, the government has actually restricted [the development ofl housing for
poor inner-city residents and has adversely affected the social
and political integrity of their communities. Because [the suburban dispersal of federally-subsidized housing through] fair
housing efforts, particularly on behalf of the nonwhite poor,
have been and continue to be futile in other than tokenistic
terms, the provision of low-income housing and community enrichment [in central cities] is being sacrificed without creating
viable alternatives. Moreover, the occurrence of spatial deconcentration is too often merely a reconcentration of people in a
different space. Finally, in light of extensive urban reinvest-

ment, many so-called impacted areas are really transitional areas; absent more low-income housing in these areas, many poor

will suffer displacement, being replaced by the return of the
middle-class to the inner city.99
II. THE URBAN CRISIS OF THE EARLY 1990s: THlE KERNER
COMMISSION REPORT REVISITED

Our special contributors have been invited to reassess the Kerner
Commission's basic recommendations and to reflect on the present circumstances that confront African Americans and American cities, the
principal objects of the Kerner Commission Report. As a prelude, we will
examine some measures of the contemporary status of African Americans in metropolitan areas-data on income and employment, educational attainment, health care, housing access, public welfare reliance,
and political power. We offer the following observations and data to illuminate changes that have occurred since 1968, and to provide a context
for the broader discussion in which our contributors will be engaged. 1°"
A.

Residential Patterns: Continued Segregation by Race and Class
The Commission contended in 1968 that changing urban residential

99. John 0. Calmore, FairHousing vs. FairHousing: The Problems with Providing IncreasedHousing OpportunitiesThrough SpatialDeconcentration, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 7,

8 (1980).
100. Of course, few choices are more perilous than those among rival data. Not only do
respected observers disagree over how to measure important phenomena, they differ even more
on what is important. On subjects as controversial and emotionally charged as American
racial relationships and urban problems, these choices can be especially difficult.
The data we have chosen are summary statistics that highlight (1) unresolved racial dis-

parities, (2)continuing urban challenges, and (3)unanswered questions, such as the effects of
desegregation on black educational performance, that have particular significance for the current policy debate. We invite our special contributors to bring forward other significant data
on these issues.
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patterns (most critically, the growing concentration of blacks in the central cities and the departure of whites to the suburbs) would, if unchecked, contribute to the deterioration of every major aspect of urban
life. In the decades since the Report was issued, many of the underlying
demographic trends forecast by the Kerner Commission have continued,
while some have abated. The black migration from the rural South
largely has ceased, and there is evidence that some African Americans
are returning from Northern cities to the South. 101 Overall, however, the
United States' population in 1993 has become more urbanized than in
1968,"02 and many of the nation's larger urban centers, especially in the
Northeast and North Central states, have retained the spatial characteristics sketched out in the Kerner Report: an older, declining central-city
area surrounded by expanding, more affluent suburbs.10 3 As predicted,
the populations of these central cities have become disproportionately
black, Hispanic, and Asian, while suburban communities have remained
disproportionately white.l a
The 1989 report of the National Research Council's Committee on
the Status of Black Americans (the "Jaynes Committee"), summarized
the data as follows:
Urban residential segregation of blacks is far greater than that
of any other large racial or ethnic group, and there is extensive
documentation of the purposeful development and maintenance
of involuntary residential exclusion and segregation.... Black
suburbanization rates remain low, and objective indicators of
socioeconomic status that predict suburbanization for Hispanics and Asian-Americans do not do so for blacks. The social
101. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1981, at 13 tbl. 12 (102d ed.) (showing black net out migration from

Northeast and Midwest, and net in migration to South and West, between 1970 and 1980).
102. In 1960, some 112,885,000 persons (63% of the population of the United States) were
classified as residents of "standard metropolitan statistical areas" (SMSAs). By comparison, in
1990, 192,726,000 persons (77.5% of the population) were classified as residents of the redefined "consolidated metropolitan statistical areas" (CMSAs). BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, No. 32, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1991, at 27
(11 th ed.) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
103. John C. Weicher, How Poverty Neighborhoods Are Changing, in NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, COMM'N ON NAT'L URBAN POLICY, INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED

STATES 68, 71-77 (Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. and M.G.H. McGeary eds., 1990); DAVID RUSK,
CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 5-8 (1993).
104. Only 33.6% of white metropolitan residents in 1990 (or 53,686,000 residents) were
classified as inhabitants of central cities, while 66.3% (or 105,757,000) were classified as "not
central city." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No. 175,
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 75-79 (1990).

Among black metropolitan residents, the pattern is almost precisely the reverse: 67.8% (or
17,344,000) are central city residents, while only 32.2% (or 8,218,000) reside outside central
city areas. Id. at 77.
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changes of the 1960s and 1970s that affected black status had
only slight effects on the residential segregation of blacks in
large cities. Blacks are not free to live where they wish,
whatever their economic status. Thus, black-white residential
separation continues to be a fundamental cleavage in American
society.105

Within cities, some researchers report that poor residents have become increasingly concentrated in certain black and Hispanic neighbor-

hoods since 1960. Yet there remains considerable dispute on how best to
measure these "ghetto" areas, and whether the increased residential con-

centration of low-income minorities represents a national trend or is
merely the experience of selected cities.10 6 Whatever the best city-by-city
105. COMMON DEsTINY, supra note 18, at 50.
106. William Julius Wilson has stimulated recent debate on this issue by theorizing that,
ironically, the urban black poor have found their plight worsened by the antidiscrimination
legislation of the 1960s, which allowed middle-class blacks to obtain better-paying jobs and to
leave formerly segregated black neighborhoods for higher-income, suburban neighborhoods.
Wilson writes:
In the earlier years, the black middle and working classes were confined by restrictive
covenants to communities also inhabited by the lower class; their very presence provided stability to inner-city neighborhoods and reinforced and perpetuated mainstream patterns of norms and behavior.
This is not the situation in the 1980s. Today's ghetto neighborhoods are populated almost exclusively by the most disadvantaged segments of the black urban community, that heterogeneous grouping of families and individuals who are outside the
mainstream of the American occupational system.
WILsoN, supra note 18, at 7-8.
Reynolds Farley disagrees, finding no increasing class stratification in African-American
communities due to out migration by middle-income blacks. He agrees that more prosperous
blacks fled from "inner city" neighborhoods to other, higher-income neighborhoods within
cities during the 1970s, but he argues that this pattern is consistent with historical patterns of
residential segregation by class among African Americans. Reynolds Farley, ResidentialSegregation of Social and Economic Groups among Blacks, 1970-1980, in TiE URBAN UNDERCLASS 274, 282-93 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) [hereinafter URBAN
UNDERCLASS]. Moreover, Farley found that suburbanization by blacks during the 1970s was
not limited to middle- or upper-income blacks. Instead, "blacks in all economic groups
crossed city boundaries and moved into the suburban ring in large numbers," id. at 293, so
that segregation by social class did not increase among blacks.
Farley explains the increased concentration of poverty in central cities largely as a function of increased poverty rates and persistent residential segregation:
If poverty rates increase substantially ... and the residential segregation of social
classes remains about the same, the population in poverty will increase and proportionally more of their neighbors will be poor. The demographic evidence for Chicago
is unambiguous about these matters. The change that [William J.] Wilson describes
in The Truly Disadvantagedis the rise in poverty among blacks, not an increase in
residential segregation among social classes.
Id. at 295.
Douglas Massey has reached a similar conclusion about the interactive effects of race and
class segregation in American cities:
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account of the changing demographics, by 1980 some 21% of the black
poor and 16% of the Hispanic poor (but only 2% of non-Hispanic white
poor) had come to live in the high-poverty,0 7inner-city neighborhoods
portrayed in the Kerner Commission Report.1
A significant percentage of middle-class blacks did leave central cities for suburban areas between 1968 and 1993.108 For example, in 1960,
When racial segregation occurs in the class-segregated environment of the typical
American city, it concentrates income deprivation within a small number of poor
black areas and generates social and economic conditions of intense disadvantage.
These conditions are mutually reinforcing and cumulative, leading directly to the
creation of underclass communities typified by high rates of family disruption, welfare dependence, crime, mortality, and educational failure. Segregation creates the
structural niche within which a self-perpetuating cycle of minority poverty and deprivation can survive and flourish.
Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid Segregation and the Making of the Underclass, 96
AM. J. Soc. 329, 350 (1990).
Paul A. Jargowsky and Mary Jo Bane have recently examined the extent to which "ghetto
poverty" (defined to include census tracts in which over 40% of the residents are poor) had
increased in the nation's Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas between 1970 and 1980.
Paul A. Jargowsky & Mary Jo Bane, Ghetto Poverty in the United States, 1970-1980, in URBAN
UNDERCLASS, supra, 235, 239. Jargowsky and Bane conclude that the growth of concentrated
poverty in some ghetto areas is a complex process, involving interactions between general increases in the poverty rate and differential out migration of poor and nonpoor persons from
ghetto neighborhoods. Id. at 269.
In none [of the four cities studied intensively] was the process a simple matter of the
poor moving into ghetto areas or the nonpoor moving out. Nor can the situation in
any city be described as one in which people basically stayed put but that changes in
the poverty rate caused more areas to be pushed over the 40 percent line. Instead
there was a general pattern of dispersion-probably part of a longer historical
trend-interacting with changes in the poverty rate and continuing high levels of
racial segregation.
Id. at 268.
Jargowsky and Bane note that while the absolute number of poor persons living in ghettos
in metropolitan areas increased by 29.5% from 1970 to 1980, the increases were not spread
uniformly among SMSAs. Instead, two-thirds of the increases came in only five Eastern and
North-Central cities-New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Newark, and Detroit-while Southern and Western cities, except for Atlanta and Baltimore, saw decreases in their ghetto populations. Id. at 255-56.
107. Jargowsky & Bane, supra note 106, at 252. William Julius Wilson and his colleagues
have found "several significant trends" in their examination of changes in the nation's 10 largest cities between 1970 and 1980:
[A] marked increase, in both relative and absolute terms, of urban poverty despite a
net loss of population; an even sharper rise in the population living in poverty and
extreme-poverty areas; an increasing concentration over time of the poor in the
poorest sections of these cities; and widely divergent patterns of concentration between whites and minorities.
William Julius Wilson et al., The Ghetto Underclass and the Changing Structure of Urban
Poverty, in QUIET RIoTs, supra note 17, at 123, 131.
108. See Larry Long & Diana DeAre, The Suburbanization of Blacks, AM.
DEMOGRAPHICS, Sept. 1981, at 16, 16-21 (emphasizing the loss suffered by central cities from
the exodus of middle-class blacks).
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about 2% of Cleveland's African-American population lived in the suburbs; by 1990, one-third did.1" 9 By 1992, a majority of all blacks in the

Washington, D.C. metropolitan area lived not in the District of Columbia, but in the suburbs."' Indeed, as of 1989, over 27% of all black
households lived in the suburbs."1 1 Yet, the moves of African-American
suburbanites most often led them not to "white" or racially integrated
suburbs, but instead to older, near-city suburbs where residents are

predominantly black or that quickly undergo racial transition to majority-black status after racial integration begins. 112 Thus, suburban blacks
in 1993 typically find themselves, as in yesterday's cities, residentially
1 13
segregated from the white majority.
109. Norman Krumholz, The Kerner Commission Twenty Years Later, in BLACK AND
WHITE, supra note 18, at 19, 25. Nonetheless, an overwhelming percentage of all black suburbanites in Cleveland live in just one community, East Cleveland, which suggests that locational
choices for blacks who have managed to move out of Cleveland's ghetto continue to be restricted. From 1960 to 1970, for example, East Cleveland's population went from 2% to 51%
black. Id.
110. Joel Garreau, CandidatesTake Note: It's a Mall World After All, WASH. POST, Aug.
10-16, 1992, at 25 (Weekly Ed.).
111. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No. 180, MONEY
INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES:

1991, at 10

(1991) [hereinafter MONEY INCOME 1991]. According to the Census Bureau, 57.2% of all
African Americans lived in central cities in 1990, while 27.6% lived in suburbs and 15.2%
lived outside of metropolitan areas. Id. About 39% of all Hispanic households lived in suburbs in 1989. Id.
112. See generally Phillip L. Clay, The Process of Black Suburbanization,14 URB.AFF.Q.
405, 419 (1979) (concluding that black suburbanization "has resulted in only the [spatial] expansion of a racially segmented housing market"); John R. Logan & Linda Brewster Stearns,
SuburbanRacialSegregation as a NonecologicalProcess, Soc. FORCES, Sept. 1981, at 61 (1981)
(exploring the influence of socioeconomic class and ethnicity on the likelihood of white community resistence to residential integration by blacks); Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A.
Denton, Suburbanization and Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 94 AM. J. Soc. 592
(1988) (examining trends in suburbanization for minority groups during the decade of the
1970s in 59 metropolitan areas).
113. In the early 1980s, Robert Lake reported that
[t]he suburbanization of blacks is being accompanied by the increasing territorial
differentiation of suburbia along racial lines-and not by integration. Comparison of
the experiences of black and white suburban homebuyers at the end of the 1970s
provides strong evidence of a suburban housing market explicitly and implicitly organized along racial lines.... The mechanisms in place to enforce and reproduce a
structural pattern based on race mean that at the individual level, suburbanization
for blacks connotes constrained residential choice, a restricted and less efficient housing search process, and limited opportunities for housing equity and wealth
accumulation.
ROBERT W.

LAKE, THE NEW SUBURBANITES:

RACE AND HOUSING IN THE SUBURBS

239

(1981).
In a more recent study, Orfield and Ashkinaze have reached similar conclusions about

black suburbanization in Atlanta during the 1980s: "In Atlanta, suburbanization for most
[middle-income] blacks does not mean crossing the color line; it means the color line is moving
out to incorporate parts of suburbia. Though they are still outside white society, blacks are
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Employment and Income Patterns: PersistentRacial Disparities

Economically, the past twenty-five years have witnessed one decade
of relative stagnation (the 1970s), seven years of vigorous economic expansion (1982-1989), and three intervals of serious recession (1974-75,
1980-82, and 1990-92)."' During this quarter century, employment
prospects and average personal incomes have improved for some middleclass African Americans.115 Yet overall higher rates of poverty have
continued to plague African-American communities, unemployment
rates among blacks have remained nearly twice those among whites, and
significant wage differentials have persisted.
1. Poverty Rates

In 1968, 12.8% of Americans had incomes that placed them below
the official poverty line. That percentage varied substantially by race;
only 10% of whites were officially classified as poor, while 33.5% of
blacks were so classified.11 6 The Census Bureau also reported that the
poverty rate was substantially greater in central cities than in nonmetro117
politan areas or the nation's suburbs.
now themselves divided by the city-suburban boundary."

GARY ORFIELD & CAROLE

ASHKINAZE, THE CLOSING DOOR: CONSERVATIVE POLICY AND BLACK OPPORTUNITY

25-

26 (1991) [hereinafter CLOSING DOOR]; see id. at 101-02, 217-18, 223-24.
114. See Richard B. Du Boff, A Tale of Two Booms: The Longest Peacetime Expansion
Was the 60s, Not the 80s, CHALLENGE, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 53, 53-54 (comparing 1960s and
1980s expansions); Michael Prowse, Is America in Decline?, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug.
1992, at 34, 34-45 (describing the U.S. economy's response to rapid economic and social
change).
115. In 1991, for example, 20.9% of all black households in the suburbs earned incomes of
$50,000 or more, while 8.6% of all suburban black households earned incomes in excess of
$70,000. MONEY INCOME 1991, supra note 111, at 10. A substantial wage gap continues to
separate average black and white suburban households, although black and white wage disparities are narrower in the suburbs than among city dwellers:
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME-1991
White

Black

Black/White Ratio

Suburbs
Over 1 million
Under 1 million

$ 40,652
31,871

29,776
20,066

0.7325
0.6296

City
Over 1 million
Under 1 million

$ 30,027
26,885

18,243
15,963

0.6076
0.5838

Id. at 9-10.
116. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No. 68, PovERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1959 TO 1968, at 2-3 (1969).

117. In 1970, 9.8% of the nation's central city households had incomes below the poverty
line, compared to 5.3% of the suburban households. Paul E. Peterson, The Urban Underclass
and the Poverty Paradox,in URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 106, at 3, 7 tbl. 1.
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Progress toward the reduction of poverty between 1968 and 1993
has been slight.'1 8 Poverty rates declined substantially between 1964 and
1973, but stagnated during the 1970s and rose again during the recessions of the early 1980s, failing to decline significantly even during the
high-growth years of the middle 1980s." 9 With the onset of the recession of 1990, poverty rates began climbing again, and in 1991 were higher
than at any time during the 1970s or 1980s-a 14.2% overall poverty
rate, reflecting poverty rates of 11.3% among whites, 32.7% among
blacks, and 28.7% among Hispanics.' 20
These overall statistics also mask decidedly different experiences
among other demographic sub-groups. Thanks largely to the expansion
of Social Security and Supplemental Security Income benefits during the
past two decades, the poverty rate among the elderly, both blacks and
whites, has fallen dramatically. 12 1 Poverty among the young, however,
has remained very high: 45.9% of all black children under the age of
eighteen lived in poverty in 1991, as did 16.8% of white children and
40.4% of Hispanic children. 122 Moreover, among single-parent families
headed by women-a growing percentage of all families during the past
twenty-five years123-poverty rates remain very high; over 32% of such
118. Sheldon Danziger and Daniel Weinberg have summarized data on current poverty
rates as follows:
Poverty in America in the early 1990s remains high. It is high relative to what it was
in the early 1970s; it is high relative to what analysts expected, given the economic
recovery of the 1980s ... ; it is high relative to what is in other countries that have
similar standards of living .... In addition, the poverty rates for some demographic
groups-minorities, elderly widows, children living in mother-only families-are
about as high today as was the poverty rate for all Americans in 1949. This lack of
progress over the past two decades-the fact that poverty in 1993 is higher than it
was in 1973-represents an American anomaly. For the first time in recent history, a
generation of children has a higher poverty rate than the preceding generation, and a
generation of adults has experienced only a modest increase in its standard of living.
Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg, The Historical Record: Trends in Family Income, Inequality, and Poverty 1 (rev. ed. Nov. 1992) (Institute for Research on Poverty Conference Paper, presented at "Poverty and Public Policy: What Do We Know? What Should
We Do?", Madison, Wisconsin, May 28-30, 1992).
119. Id. at 1-2.
120. CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, NUMBER IN POVERTY HITS 20-YEAR
HIGH As RECESSION ADDS 2 MILLION MORE POOR, ANALYSIS FINDS 4 (1992).
121. In 1964, 28.5% of all elderly persons lived below the poverty line. Sheldon H. Danziger et al., Antipoverty Policy: Effects on the Poor and the Nonpoor, in FIGHTING POVERTY,
supra note 8, at 50, 56 tbl. 3.2. By 1980, the percentage had fallen to 15.7%, and by 1990, to
12.2%. CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 120, at 4.
122. CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 120, at 4.
123. According to Mary Jo Bane:

[F]amily structure has changed dramatically over the past few decades, away from
traditional married-couple families: in 1959, 85.8 percent of the population lived in
male-headed families; in 1983, 74.4 percent did.... Household composition has
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families were poor in 1989.124
Recent observers have suggested that current poverty rates are a
product of several convergent factors: the stagnation in overall wage
growth during the past fifteen years, a substantial decrease in federal and
state financial assistance to low-income families, and changes in the demographic composition of American families. 125 One thing is clear: Cities
have been asked to bear the greatest burden of the new poverty. In central-city areas, poverty rates have risen sharply, from 9.8% in 1970 to
15.4% in 1987, while suburban rates have risen only slightly, from 5.3%
to 6.5%, during the same period, and nonmetropolitan poverty rates
have actually declined from 14.8% to 13.8%.126 Viewed from another
angle, central cities, which had housed only 27% of the nation's poor in
1959, by 1985 had become home to 43% of the poverty population. This
growing concentration of urban poverty was especially high for African
Americans; the proportion of poor blacks living in central cities climbed
from 38% in 1959 to 61% in 1985.127
2.

Employment Rates

Professors Moss and Tilly have recently summarized the contemporary evidence on black male employment rates:
Black men's fortunes in the United States labor market have
taken a decided turn for the worse. Joblessness among black
men has climbed through the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Until
the mid-1970s, growing joblessness was offset to some extent by
the narrowing of racial wage differentials among men. But
since the mid-1970s, the black/white wage gap has begun to
widen anew.
Black men's employment/population ratios have been falling since the 1950s, and have dropped relative to those of white
changed much more dramatically among blacks over the two decades, with the percentage living in female-headed families rising from 19.0 percent in 1959 to 36.7
percent in 1983.

Mary Jo Bane, Household Composition and Poverty, in FIGHTING POVERTY, supra note 8, at
208, 213-14.
124. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES
ERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1988 AND 1989, at 68 (1991).

125. See, eg., Danziger & Weinberg, supra note 118, at 26-27;

P-60, No. 171, Pov-

ISAAC SHAPIRO

& ROBERT

GREENSTEIN, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, SELECTIVE PROSPERITY: IN-

1977, at 11-15 (1991).
126. Peterson, supra note 117, at 3, 7 tbl. 1.
127. John D. Kasarda, The Severely Distressed in Economically Transforming Cities in
DRUGS, CRIME AND SOCIAL ISOLATION 46 (Adele V. Harrell & George E. Peterson eds.,
1992).
CREASING INCOME DISPARITIES SINCE

1993]

THE URBAN CRISIS

1317

men since the mid-1960s. During the 1960s and early 1970s,
the relative fall was driven primarily by black men's more rapid
decrease in labor force participation; since then a widening gap
in unemployment rates has accounted for most of black men's
relative decline. 128

Christopher Jencks offers additional data confirming that black male unemployment rates have remained more than twice as high as white rates

throughout this period.12 9
One prominent theory ties these lower African-American employ-

ment rates directly to residential segregation, suggesting that most new
job creation has occurred in predominantly white suburban areas that are
relatively inaccessible to urban minorities.13 ° Research conducted by
James Rosenbaum and Susan Popkin seems to support the view that the
"spatial mismatch" between the urban residences of low-income minorities and the developing suburban jobs, rather than individual attitudes or

job skills, explains much black urban unemployment. 31 Rosenbaum and
128. PHILIP MOSS & CHRIS TILLY, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, WHY BLACK
MEN ARE DOING WORSE IN THE LABOR MARKET: A REVIEW OF SUPPLY-SIDE AND DEMAND-SIDE EXPLANATIONS 3-4 (1991); see also JOHN BOUND & RICIARD B. FREEMAN,
NAT'L BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC., WHAT WENT WRONG? THE EROSION OF

RELATIVE EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG YOUNG BLACK MEN IN THE

1980spassim

(1991) (discussing "widening in black-white earnings and employment gaps among young men
from the mid-1970s through the 1980s"); COLOR LINE, supra note 18, at 250; COMMON
DESTINY, supra note 18, at 18, 301-07 (discussing employment trends among black males);
Charles A. Hirschman, Minoritiesin the LaborMarket: Cyclical PatternsandSecular Trends
in Joblessness, in DIVIDED OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 17, at 63, 63-85.
129. Jencks reports the following changes between 1969 and 1987 in the unemployment
rates (in percentages) among non-institutionalized males, ages 25-54:
No Job During Week of Survey
Whites
Blacks

1969
4.4
9.9

Whites
Blacks

1968
2.3
4.7

1975
10.0
23.4

1980
8.8
19.4

1987
10.2
22.2

1979
3.8
10.4

1986
4.6
13.6

No Job During Calendar Year
1974
3.4
11.6

Christopher Jencks, Is the American UnderclassGrowing?,in URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note
106, at 28, 44 tbl. 3.
130. See, e.g., James H. Johnson, Jr. & Melvin L. Oliver, Economic Restructuring and
Black Male Joblessness in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 12 URB. GEOGRAPHY 542 passim (1991);
John F. Kain, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Three Decades Later, 3 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 371 passim (1992); John F. Kain, HousingSegregation, Negro Employment, andMetropolitanDecentralization,82 Q.J. ECON. 175 passim (1968); John D. Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass, 501 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCo. 26 passim
(1989).
131. James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, Employment and Earningsof Low-Income
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Popkin evaluated the labor market experiences of public housing residents in Chicago's inner-city, nearly all of them African Americans, who
were given subsidized housing in suburban communities as part of a
court-ordered remedy in a massive housing segregation case.13 2 In comparing the experience of these new suburbanites with those of tenants
who remained behind in private apartments obtained under the HUD
Section 8 certificate program, Rosenbaum and Popkin concluded:
The Gautreaux participants responded to the improved employment opportunities in middle-class suburbs even though
they came from low-income communities and had presumably
been exposed to both negative attitudes about work and the
work disincentives of the welfare system.... Most noteworthy,
even after we controlled for training, education, and previous
jobs, moving to the suburbs led to greater employment than
moving within the city. That is, even respondents who were
relatively disadvantaged did better in the suburbs than they did
133
in the city.
Other data suggest, however, that suburban versus urban residence
is not the sole explanatory variable for racial employment differences.
John Kasarda recently has reported that blacks experienced higher overall unemployment rates during the boom years of 1986-1988, even when
134
differences in urban/suburban residence are taken into account.
Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs, in URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 106, at 342,
346-55.
132. Id.; see Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 305-06 (1976). See generally Florence Wagman Roisman & Philip Tegeler, Improving and Expanding Housing Opportunitiesfor Poor
People of Color: Recent Developments in FederalandState Courts, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
312, 329-31 (1990) (discussing Gautreaux).
133. Rosenbaum & Popkin, supra note 131, at 353-54.
134. Kasarda reports the following data on unemployment:
UNEMPLOYMENT RATEs-1986-1988 (IN PERCENTAGES)

Race &
Education

Central
City

Suburb

Less than H.S.
H.S. Graduate
Some College
College Graduate

35.5
16.7
10.2
6.0

27.5
13.4
8.6
4.7

Black
Less than H.S.
H.S. Graduate
Some College
College Graduate

44.3
25.8
15.4
14.7

32.5
26.3
13.0

Region
Northeast
White
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Income Levels

As noted, African-American workers have not only continued to
face higher unemployment rates, but those with steady jobs have continued to receive salaries that are, on average, notably below those paid to
white employees.1 35 Researchers observe that wage differentials between
Midwest
White
Less than H.S.
H.S. Graduate
Some College
College Graduate

38.9
21.7
16.6
5.3

24.7
14.1
9.3
5.7

58.0
36.4
27.3
10.4

30.5
24.7
12.2

Black
Less than H.S.
H.S. Graduate
Some College
College Graduate

John D. Kasarda, StructuralFactors Affecting the Location and Timing of Urban Underclass
Growth, 11 URB. GEOGRAPHY 234, 256-57 (1990).
Recent studies employing the "audit methodology"-sending "testers" of similar qualifications, but different racial backgrounds, to apply for the same job openings-have revealed
substantial racial discrimination against blacks who seek entry positions in the Chicago and
Washington, D.C. areas, especially for higher level jobs. See generally CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA (Michael Fix & Raymond
J. Struyk eds., 1992) [hereinafter CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE] (containing 13 articles
discussing auditing for discrimination).
135. Marta Tienda and Leif Jensen report the following average wage disparities as of
1984:
WAGES AND SALARIES

(in constant 1985 dollars)

1969
1979
1984

Blacks

Mexicans

Puerto
Ricans

Non-Hispanic
Whites

18,458
19,219
16,680

20,419
21,912
20,073

17,021
16,009
14,120

29,888
29,534
27,296

Marta Tienda & Leif Jensen, Poverty and Minorities: A Quarter-CenturyProfile of Color and
Socioeconomic Disadvantage, in DIVIDED OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 17, at 23, 34 tbl. 3.
Other recent data on average weekly earnings among full-time wage and salary workers
during the economic expansion of the 1980s (although unadjusted for educational attainment
and job qualifications) confirms the picture of significant wage differentials by race-and by
gender as well.
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black and white workers continued to widen during the late 1980s. 13 6
The Kerner Commission suggested in 1968 that wage disparities between white and black workers could be explained, in large part, by the
limited range of jobs open to most urban African Americans: "[Tihe
concentration of male Negro employment at the lowest end of the occupational scale is greatly depressing the incomes of United States Negroes
in general. In fact, this is the single most important source of poverty
among Negroes. It is even more important than unemployment." 137 Yet
despite significant advances toward occupational parity since 1968,
13
blacks have yet to achieve parity in wage levels. 1
MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNING

(current dollars)
White
Males $
Females $
Black
Males $
Females $

1983

1985

1988

1989

387
254

417
281

465
318

482
334

293
231

304
252

347
288

348
301

STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr,supra note 102, at 415 tbl. 678. Since the gap between black and

white educational attainment, measured by years of school completed, has largely narrowed,
see infra note 152, a closure of the racial wage gap should have occurred if earlier wage differentials reflected no more than educational differences.
136. According to Moss and Tilly:
Between 1973 and 1989, the earnings of young black males deteriorated relative to
whites. The relative decline occurred within all educational groups and was most
severe among college graduates and high school dropouts.
Controlling for education does not substantially change the relative earnings decline
for blacks. Blacks experienced declines in relative earnings in every education group.
Moss & TILLY, supra note 128, at 3.
137. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at 255. The Commission reported the
following disparities for the year 1966:
PERCENTAGE OF MALE WORKERS IN EACH
TYPE OF OccuPATION-1966

Type of Occupation
Professional, Technical, Managerial
Clerical and sales
Craftsmen and foremen
Operatives
Service Workers
Non-farm laborers
Farmers and farm workers

White
27
14
20
20
6
6
7

Nonwhite
9
9
12
27
16
20
8

Id. at 254.
138. Some respected scholars view the evidence more positively. In summarizing black
economic gains achieved during the forty years since Gunnar Myrdal first issued his famous
report in 1940, Smith and Welch write:
The changes over the last forty years were dramatic. Fully 20 percent of working
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One interesting comparison looks at median household incomes
among young, two-parent families where both spouses are working.
Among those groups, black and white median household incomes converged by 1991. Indeed, in the average black two-parent family, aged 2534 (where both parents worked) incomes were 84.1% of the median incomes for similar white families.1 39 In two-parent families, black working women had achieved 90.9% of the median weekly income of white
women by 1989.1 4 It was among black men, even in two-parent families, that incomes trailed substantially, amounting to only 70.4% of white
1 41

male incomes.

The contributors to this special issue doubtless will examine these
and other data, assessing the extent to which residential segregation, employment discrimination, household composition, or other impersonal
economic forces may have contributed to these racially disparate labor
market patterns, which have persisted at every educational level, in good
economic times and bad, throughout the past two decades.
C. Educational Changes: Narrowed Gaps in Attainment and
Achievement, But a Stalemate on Desegregation
At the time the Kerner Commission Report-was released in 1968,
most African Americans, North and South, attended public schools that
were segregated by race. Although public school segregation had been
black men in 1980 were still part of the poor black underclass, a reminder that many
blacks remained left out and left behind. But placed in historical perspective, such
figures still represent enormous progress toward eradicating black poverty. Political
rhetoric on the race issue must eventually balance two compelling truths. America
has made considerable strides in reducing black poverty; but by the standards of a

just society, black poverty remains at unacceptably high levels.
However, the real story of the last forty years has been the emergence of the
black middle class, whose income gains have been real and substantial. The growth
in the size of the black middle class was so spectacular that as a group it outnumbers
the black poor. Finally, for the first time in American history, a sizable number of
black men are economically better off than white middle-class America. During the
last twenty years alone, the odds of a black man penetrating the ranks of the economic elite increased tenfold.
JAMES P. SMITH & FINIS R. WELCH, CLOSING THE GAP: FORTY YEARS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS FOR BLACKS viii-ix (1986).
Yet Smith and Welch acknowledge that the rate of black economic progress has dissipated in the 1970s and 1980s, and that future advancements are at best uncertain. Id. at xxiiXXiX.

139. MONEY INCOME 1991, supra note 111, at 30-31. In 1991, the median annual income
comparisons were $38,374 for white couples, compared to $32,268 for black couples. The
median income for two-parent Hispanic families was only $26,074-67.9% of the median
white income. Id.
140. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 102, at 416 tbl. 679.
141. Id.
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declared unconstitutional in 1954,142 most school districts had not yet
adopted effective desegregation plans by 1968.143 At that time, despite
substantial improvement since the 1940s, 1" black students lagged far behind whites on most educational measures: average years of school completed, 45 percentage of students obtaining high school and/or college
degrees,' 46 and average performance on national standardized achievement tests.147
Shortly before the Kerner Commission Report was issued in 1968,
Professor James Coleman and his colleagues had published an influential
study strongly suggesting that a child's academic success was determined
chiefly by his or her socio-economic background, and that schools, therefore, could do relatively little to affect educational outcomes. 148 The
Coleman Report generated intense academic controversy; 14 9 it also
142. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
143. "The proportion of black pupils in desegregated schools in the South rose from 2
percent in 1964 to 15 percent in 1966, to 18 percent in 1968, and reached 46 percent in 1973.
The proportions in the North and West, where the financial sanctions [under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964] were not invoked, were constant at 28-29 percent." COMMON DESTINY, supra
note 18, at 75 (citation omitted).
144. The median average number of years of schooling completed by black males ages 2529 nearly doubled between 1940 and 1970, from 6.5 years to nearly 12 years, while the median
average among white males rose much less sharply, from 10.5 years in 1940 to over 12.5 years
by 1970. Id. at 334, 335 fig. 7-3. The median gap between black and white females also converged toward parity during this same period. Black women ages 25-29 moved from an average of 7.5 years of schooling completed to nearly 12 years, while white women made less
dramatic advances, from almost 11.0 years to 12.5 years. Id.
145. Id.
146. Just over 70% of whites of both sexes had completed high school in the mid-1960s;
among blacks, high school completion rates were approximately 50%. Id. at 338.
Among white males, the college completion rate in 1970 was 20%; for white females, it
was just under 15%. Among both black males and females, college completion rates were
approximately 6%. Id. at 337 fig. 7-4.
147. Results for the academic year 1969-70 revealed substantial gaps between the educational performance of blacks and whites at all levels of schooling. Reading scores from the
National Assessment of Educational Progress are summarized below:
CORRECT SCORES

(percent)
9-Year-Olds
White
Black
66.4
49.7

13-Year-Olds
White
62.6

Black
45.4

17-Year-Olds
White
Black
71.2
51.7

Id. at 349 tbl. 7-1.
148. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY passim
(1966).
149. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER JENCKS ET AL., INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE
EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 16-17 (1972); ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY passim (Frederick Mosteller & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1972). But
see Ronald Edmonds et al., A Black Response to ChristopherJencks's Inequality and Certain
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tended to dampen hopes among some educational reformers that black
educational performance could be improved significantly, either through
desegregation or through other educational programs directed at poor
150
and minority school children.
Since 1968, contrary to those apprehensions, the black/white gap in
academic achievement has narrowed significantly, 5 ' as "levels of schooling and rates of return to schooling [among black schoolchildren] have
converged toward those of whites."' 52 During this period, a large percentage of African-American children have begun to attend desegregated
Other Issues, 43 HARV. EDUC. REv. 76, 77 (1973) (strongly contesting Jencks's "methods,
conclusions, and recommendations").
150. "Mhe common wisdom of the mid-1970s," Nathan Glazer recalled, was "that
schooling did not improve achievement, achievement did not improve economic circumstances." Nathan Glazer, Education and TrainingPrograms and Poverty, in FIGHTING POV-

ERTY, supra note 8, at 152, 152. Glazer continued:

Equality ofEducationalOpportunity had appeared in 1966, at a time of great ferment
in programs addressed to poverty, but its impact on the academic community was
expanded by the reanalyses of its data in Mosteller and Moynihan (1972). Also,
Jencks's Inequality appeared in 1972. While it would be unfair to summarize the
message of these major works as "nothing worked," that is certainly how the
message came across .... The narrower evaluations of specific programs available
during the first decade after the War on Poverty confirmed the verdict: nothing that
one did in education worked.
Id. at 152-53.
151. During the years 1969 through 1984, the average performance of black children on
national achievement tests improved more, at all grade levels, than did achievement among
white children. Representative data on reading performance are as follows:
CORRECT SCORES (percent)
9-Year-Olds

13-Year-Olds

17-Year-Olds

White

Black

White

Black

White

Black

1969-70
1979-80
1983-84

66.4
69.3
69.1

49.7
59.6
57.4

62.6
62.6
64.4

45.4
49.6
52.4

71.2
70.6
72.5

51.7
52.2
60.0

Change,
1969-84

+2.7

+7.7

+1.8

+7.0

+1.3

+8.3

COMMON DEsTINY, supra note 18, at 349 tbl. 7-1. The Jaynes Committee drew three conclusions from these and other relevant data:
First, school achievement scores of blacks have increased at a faster rate than those
of whites. Second, despite gains by blacks, substantial gaps in school achievement
remain. Third, among the youngest age group and birth cohort, there is evidence of
a possible decline in black performance relative to that of whites....
The math and verbal SAT performance of blacks has also improved in absolute terms
and relative to whites in the past several years .... Overall, the SAT results are
consistent with other data. There is a fairly clear record of improving achievement
test performance by blacks.
Id. at 348, 350.
152. Robert D. Mare & Christopher Winship, Ethnic and Racial Patternsof Educational
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public schools, especially in the Southern states. 113 One principal quesAttainment and School Enrollment, in DIVIDED OPPORTUNITES, supra note 17, at 173, 174.
Mare and Winship found a sharply narrowing gap among younger blacks and whites by 1980:
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY AGE AND SEX FOR SELECTED GROUPS 1980

Male
Age
26-35

Black
12.12

Female
White
13.55

Black
12.21

White
13.05

Id. at 184-85; see also COMMON DESTINY, supra note 18, at 335 fig. 7-3 (providing data evidencing narrowing of gap).
Rates of high school completion among white youth, according to the Jaynes Commission, climbed to just under 90% by 1980; for blacks, high school completion rates jumped from
50% in 1965 to nearly 80% in the early 1980s. Id. at 338.
Rates of college completion during this period climbed from 21% to over 25% among
white males, and from 15% to 23% among white females. After increasing dramatically in the
early 1970s, both black college enrollment and black completion rates languished and even
declined during the mid-1970s, standing just above 11% for black females and over 10% for
black males by 1980. Id. at 337 fig. 7-4.
153. According to Gary Orfield, the following percentages of black children attended desegregated schools during selected years between 1968 and 1986 in the 15 states with the largest black student populations:
PERCENTAGE OF BLACK STUDENTS IN SCHOOLS
MORE THAN 50% WHITE, BY STATE

State
New York
Texas
California
Georgia
Florida
Louisiana
Michigan

Black Enrollment
1986
(% of Total
Enrollment)
518,014 (16.5)
480,250 (14.4)
453,780 (09.0)
451,541 (37.9)
373,143 (23.7)
324,414 (41.3)
321,642 (19.8)

1968 1980 1986
(% in Desegregated
Schools)
32.31 23.26
19.2
25.25 36.01
36.7
22.49 24.67
23.4
14.03 39.89
40.7
23.21 60.35
54.9
08.89 34.21
38.4
20.60 18.14 23.3

Percent Change
1968-1986
-13.11
+11.45
+00.91
+26.67
+31.69
+29.51
+02.70

Illinois

320,326 (18.7)

18.62 20.55

16.8

+03.18

North Car.
Miss.
Alabama
South Car.
Ohio
Virginia
New Jersey

301,456
299,387
279,845
249,363
240,095
235,879
214,760

28.31
06.71
08.29
14.19
27.74
26.90
33.88

62.5
19.7
36.2
40.0
32.4
50.5
27.2

+34.19
+12.99
+27.91
+25.81
+04.66
+23.6
-06.68

(28.9)
(55.5)
(37.0)
(44.5)
(15.0)
(23.7)
(17.4)

64.04
23.56
44.28
40.12
41.14
42.27
23.29

1968-1986, at 10 tbl. 8 (National School Boards Ass'n 1989).
The data reveal that Southern schools by 1986 had become more racially integrated than
schools in any other region. Id. at 9. According to Orfield and colleagues, however,
[t]here [are] clear signs... that the long-standing achievements in the South and in
parts of the Border states [are] beginning to erode. This [is] particularly clear in the
cases of Alabama and Mississippi which show major increases in segregation and
have joined the list of the nation's most segregated states for black students. Other
states, including Florida, are experiencing gradual declines in relatively high levels of
GARY ORFIELD ET AL., STATUS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION,
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tion in 1993 is whether the significant gains in academic achievement
among black schoolchildren have resulted from-or have merely coincided with-the increase in desegregated schooling during those years.

Many researchers have concluded that desegregation substantially improves the educational achievement and the "life chances" of African-

American children.1 54 Others, predictably, have disagreed.155
A reliable answer is made less certain by several factors. As Robert
Crain and Rita Mahard have stressed, much depends upon how school
districts implement desegregation and on the factors that accompany it:

Desegregation sometimes results in better curricula or facilities;
it often results in blacks having better trained or more cogni-

tively skilled teachers; it is frequently accompanied by a major
effort to upgrade the quality of education; and it almost always

results in socioeconomic desegregation. When desegregation is
accompanied by all of these factors, it should not be surprising

that there are immediate achievement gains half to two-thirds
of the time. This suggests that desegregation is sufficient but
not necessary to obtain these gains, since there are other ways
to achieve curriculum reform or better teaching if the political

will is present. 156
In many officially desegregated schools, however, extensive racial isola1 57
tion remains the rule at the classroom level.
integration, declines that may well reflect the failure of many districts in those states
to update their desegregation plans in the past fifteen years as vast demographic
changes have occurred. The evidence of a significant increase in integration in Mis-

souri, on the other hand, shows the potential value of large-scale city-suburban voluntary exchanges of the sort developed in the metropolitan St. Louis consent
agreement in the mid-1980s.

Id. at 29.
154. See, e.g., Jomills H. Braddock II & James M. McPartland, Social-Psychological
Processes That PerpetuateRacial Segregation: The RelationshipBetween School and Employment Desegregation, 19 J. BLACK STUD. 267, 284-87 (1989); Jomills H. Braddock II et al., A
Long-Term View ofSchool Desegregation: Some Recent Studies of Graduatesas Adults, 66 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 259, 260-64 (1984); Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, Desegregationand
Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, in School Desegregation: Lessons of the First
Twenty-five Years, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1978, at 17 passim; see also Christopher Jencks, Comment, in FIGHTING POVERTY, supra note 8, at 173, 176 ("Such evidence as
we have suggests that school desegregation has reduced the black-white [achievement] gap
more than Title I [the federal compensatory education program].").
155.

JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION,

1968-1973, at 78-80

(1975); David J. Armor, The Evidence on Busing, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1972, at 90, 10916.
156. Crain & Mahard, supra note 154, at 49.
157. See JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: How SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALITY 1171 (1985); Janet Eyler et al., Resegregation: Segregation Within DesegregatedSchools, in THE
CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 126, 126-45 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis D.
Hawley eds., 1983).
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Moreover, compensatory educational programs, including preschool
programs such as Head Start"5 8 and educational services for poor children funded through the Title I/Chapter I Program of the Elementary
and Secondary Act of 1965,159 have been implemented in both segregated
and desegregated settings since 1968. This poses questions about the60rel-

ative effects of desegregation versus other compensatory programs.'

Whatever its educational value, school desegregation-a chief focus

of black educational reform in 1968-has become, by 1993, little more
than a theoretical issue in many urban school districts. Several Supreme
Court decisions in the 1970s severely limited the legal authority of fed-

eral courts to issue school desegregation decrees across school district
lines in non-Southern metropolitan areas. 16 1 Given the high degree of
158. Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508, 516-20 (1964) (repealed and replaced by 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9831-9852 (1988)).
159. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, 27-36 (codified as 20 U.S.C. § 2701 and scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. 111990)).
160. A number of studies have reported positive educational effects among children who
participate in Head Start programs. See, e.g., RUTH HUBBLE McKEY ET AL., THE IMPACT
OF HEAD START ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES: FINAL REPORT OF THE
HEAD START EVALUATION, SYNTHESIS AND UTILIZATION PROJECT 63-64 (1985) (summarizing the studies of Head Start's impact on a child's cognitive development); Edward Zigler,
Assessing Head Start at 20: An Invited Commentary, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 603, 603
(1985) (stating that Head Start deserves "credit for the part [it] plays as a national laboratory
for early childhood intervention"). Nonetheless, there is dispute about whether Head Start
leads to permanent improvement in achievement test scores or whether its effects are limited to
maintenance of grade level and avoidance of placement in special education classes. See Richard B. Darlington et a]., PreschoolProgramsand Later School Competence of Childrenof Low
Income Families, 208 SCIENCE 202, 203-04 (1980); Glazer, supra note 150, at 157.
Some studies, moreover, have found positive educational gains from participation in Title
I/Chapter I programs in earlier grades, but a declining impact as students progress to higher
grades. Launor F. Carter, The SustainingEffects Study of CompensatoryandElementary Edu-

cation, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Aug.-Sept. 1984, at 4, 6-7; see, e.g., Thomas W.Fagan & Camilla
A. Heid, ChapterI ProgramImprovement: Opportunity and Practice,72 PHI DELTA KAPPAN
582, 584-85 (1991) (assessing the impact of efforts by federal, state, and local officials to improve Chapter I education). The wide variety of permitted local uses of these compensatory
funds hinders any broad generalization about program effectiveness.
161. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976) (holding that
"[n]either school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-byyear adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action eliminated from
the system"); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (holding that federal courts
may not order interdistrict school desegregation without proof that school districts were
drawn to further segregation, or "that there has been a constitutional violation within one
district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district"); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 203-05 (1972) (holding that the existence of metropolitan
school segregation will not require affirmative judicial intervention, absent proof that the segregation is the product of intentional racial discrimination by state or local officials). Gary
Orfield views the Milliken decision as the effective end of national commitment to urban
desegregation:

1993]

THE URBAN CRISIS

1327

residential segregation that characterizes Northern and Western urban

areas, the crucial educational issue for these systems has become how to
educate a public school population that is disproportionately poor and
overwhelmingly nonwhite. 6 ' Although numerous experiments with a
variety of new educational approaches are underway in 1993,163 no firm
consensus has emerged on how best to address the needs of urban minor-

ity schoolchildren.
In confronting these educational trends, our Special Contributors
face a formidable task: to assess the value of school desegregation and of
"in-place" educational approaches, and to outline promising educational
reforms for urban schoolchildren.
D. Health Care: Largely Separate and Still Unequal

The Kerner Commission reported in 1968 that "[t]he residents of
the racial ghetto are significantly less healthy than most other Americans. They suffer from higher mortality rates, higher incidence of major

diseases, and lower availability and utilization of medical services."' 164
Even outside "racial ghetto" neighborhoods, the health of African Amer-

icans in 1968 was, on average, far poorer than that of whites, whether
There has been no progress in school desegregation on a national level since the
Supreme Court's decision in [Milliken], which created an overwhelming barrier to
city-suburban desegregation in the largest cities. None of the cities covered by the
Kerner Report have succeeded in winning such a plan. The two that sued their
suburbs and carried out a comprehensive legal battle, St. Louis and Milwaukee, both
ended up signing settlements with suburban districts in the 1980s that permitted a
substantial number of blacks to transfer to the suburbs but left many segregated
black schools behind. The Supreme Court's Detroit decision, together with the almost total failure of state and national leadership on the issue, has left the country
without tools to deal with the vast disparity between minority central-city school
districts and schools in white suburbs.
Gary Orfield, Separate Societies: Have the Kerner Warnings Come True?, in QUIET RIOTS,
supra note 17, at 100, 116-17. For a comprehensive examination of the current status of desegregation efforts, finding more post-Milliken progress than does Orfield, see James S. Liebman,
DesegregatingPolitics: "All-Out" School DesegregationExplained, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1463,
1465-73 (1990).
162. See generally COLOR LINE, supra note 18, at 205-07 (discussing the implications for
educational policy of recent demographic changes in central cities and charting changes in
enrollment and racial segregation).
163. See, eg., James P. Comer, EducatingPoor Minority Children, ScI. AM., Nov. 1988, at
42, 42-48 (discussing an intervention project at inner-city schools conducted by Yale University's Child Study Center); Spencer H. Holland, Positive Role Models for Primary-GradeBlack
Inner-City Males, EQUITY & EXCELLENCE, Fall 1991, at 40, 42-44 (discussing viability of
same-sex classes and the use of male volunteers in urban primary grades); Note, Creating
Space for RacialDifference: The Case for African-American Schools, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 187, 187-92 (1992) (describing the implementation of separate African-American schools
in various U.S. cities).
164. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at 269.
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measured by infant mortality rates, 165 life expectancy rates, 166 or effective

access to medical services. 167
Twenty-five years later, despite generally improving health care for
all Americans, racial disparities in health care persist widely.16 While
infant mortality among black infants has dropped sharply in absolute
terms, black infants remain over twice as likely as whites to die within
the first year of life.' 6 9 Likewise, although life expectancies have improved significantly, for both blacks and whites, average black life expectancy is still five to seven years shorter than that of whites. 17 0
During this period, African-American efforts to achieve better ac-

cess to health care have been a mixed tale of success and failure. 17 1 The
dramatic expansion of the Medicaid program has brought medical care
165. The Commission reported that the white infant mortality rate in 1965 was 21.5 per
1000 live births; for nonwhites, the rate was 40.3 per 1000 live births. Id. at 270.
166. In 1965, whites over the age of 25 had an average life expectancy of 73.6 years, while
nonwhites had an average life expectancy of only 68.3 years. This disparity, the Commission
reported, had widened between 1960 and 1965. Id. at 270-71.
167. The poorer health of African Americans could be explained, in part, by the fact that
"Negroes with incomes similar to those of whites spend less on medical services and visit
medical specialists less often," id. at 271, a fact linked to the difficulty experienced by African
Americans in obtaining access to doctors and medical facilities. This inaccessibility was due
both to the "geographic concentration of doctors in higher income areas in large cities and...
discrimination against Negroes by doctors and hospitals." Id. at 272.
168. See, e.g., Sylvia Drew Ivie, EndingDiscriminationin Health Care: A Dream Deferred,
in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTs ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 282,
282-92 (1980) [hereinafter U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS] (documenting health disparities between whites
and nonwhites at all ages, over a wide range of diseases and conditions); Akwasi Osei, The
Persistence of Differing Trends in African-American Mortality and Morbidity Rates, in BLACK
AND WHITE, supra note 18, at 128, 128. See generally HEALTH POLICIES AND BLACK AMERICANS (David P. Willis ed., 1989) (examining the impact of health care policies on African
Americans).
169. Between 1960 and 1988, the white infant mortality rate declined from 22.9 deaths per
1000 live births to 11.0 deaths; among blacks, infant mortality fell from 44.3 deaths to 21.4
deaths. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supranote 102, No. 111, at 77. While the nationwide infant
mortality rate in 1982 was 11.5 deaths per thousand, in Washington, D.C. and Detroit-two
cities with large minority populations-the rates were 21.2 and 21.8 per thousand respectively.
Clay H. Wellborn, Central City PopulationCharacteristics,CONG. RES. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1988,
at 9, 9.
170. Average life expectancy at birth among white males in 1988 was 72.3 years; for white
females, the average was 78.9 years. Among blacks, the 1988 figures for males and females
were 64.9 years and 73.4 years, respectively. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 102, No.
107, at 74.
For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Kenneth G. Manton et al., Health
Differentials Between Blacks and Whites: Recent Trends in Mortality and Morbidity, 65
MILBANK Q. 129, 137-95 (Supp. I 1987).
171. See generally COMMON DESTINY, supra note 18, at 393-428 (discussing health trends
among African Americans); HEALTH CARE ISSUES IN BLACK AMERICA: POLICIES,
PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS 3-56 (Voodrow Jones, Jr. & Mitchell F. Rice eds., 1987)
(presenting an overview of "Black Health Care and Health Status").
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to millions of low-income blacks, and the Medicare program similarly
has had a positive effect upon the elderly black population.1 72 Nonetheless, Medicaid eligibility varies widely from state to state, and, as of 1984,
22% of all African Americans had neither private health care insurance
nor access to Medicaid coverage. 173 Moreover, many hospitals and nursing homes have chosen to limit the number of Medicaid and Medicare.
17 4
patients they treat, with predictably adverse impact on black patients.
Recent studies also suggest that many doctors provide inferior treatment
1 75
to African-Americans for some medical conditions.
Racial disparities in health care coverage have an important geographical dimension as well, with strongly adverse consequences for the
urban, minority poor. While 15% of the nonelderly population lacked

health insurance coverage in 1988, 34% of poor residents in urban areas
172. "Since 1970, Medicaid has provided health coverage for about one of every five blacks
under age 65. Approximately one-third of all Medicaid beneficiaries are black, and Medicare's

coverage of the elderly has assured minimum benefits for blacks aged 65 or older." COMMON
DESTINTY, supra note 18, at 430; see also Diane Rowland, Medicaid: Financing Care for LowIncome Americans 3-5 (Nov. 1991) (Conference Paper presented at "An African American
Health Care Agenda: Strategies For Reforming an Unjust System," Johns Hopkins University, Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 1991) (discussing Medicaid's role in meeting the health needs of African
Americans).
173. COMMON DESTINY, supra note 18, at 430; see also Stephen H. Long, Public versus
Employment-related Health Insurance: Experience and Implicationsfor Black and Nonblack
Americans, 65 MILBANK Q. 200, 202-03 tbl. 1 (Supp. 1 1987) (showing sources of health insurance, by race and age, and including percentages of uninsured). Other investigators have reported that the percentage of African Americans not covered by any public or private health
insurance rose during the decade from 1977 through 1987. Pamela Farley Short et al., Health
Insurance of Minorities in the United States, 1 J. HEALTH CARE POOR & UNDERSERVED 9
passim (1990).
174. See Geraldine Dallek, Health Care for America's Poor: Separate and Unequal, 20
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 361, 365-71 (1986); Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI. Defending Health Care Discrimination-ItShouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 939,
941-42 (1990) (citing Stan Dorn et al., Anti-DiscriminationProvisions and Health CareAccess:
New Slants on OldApproaches, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 439, 441 (1986)); see also Linton v.
Commissioner of Health & Env't, 779 F. Supp. 925, 934-35 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that
Tennessee's limited bed certification policy, under which participating nursing homes could
decline to accept Medicaid patients in a majority of their beds violated Title VI), aff'd, 923
F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1991). See generally SuBcoMM. ON INTERGOV'TAL RELATIONS AND
HUMAN RESOURCES, HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 99TH CONG., 2D SEs. 58

(Comm. Print 1986) (discussing potential Title VI violations, including segregation, both
within and between health care facilities); JOAN STIEBER & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, 140 HosPiTALS NAMED FOR PATIENT DUMPING VIOLATIONS: A REPORT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES' RECORD IN ENFORCING THE FEDERAL "PATIENT DUMP-

ING" LAW (1991) (estimating that "dumping," or denying delivery of care to indigent or uninsured individuals, occurs 250,000 times each year in U.S. hospitals).
175. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Black-White Disparities in Health Care, 263
JAMA 2344, 2344 (1990) (stating that blacks are only one-half as likely as whites to receive
angiography and one-third as likely to receive bypass surgery for anterior myocardial infarction, even taking severity of heart disease into account).
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were uncovered. 176 Even minority residents who could pay for health
care found that urban health care providers were becoming increasingly
scarce or overburdened for several reasons: overcrowding of public hospitals,1 77 clinic closures, 178 and "runaway" hospitals that have eliminated
or reduced medical services in central cities, 179 and a shortage of physicians and dentists willing to practice medicine in urban, minority
neighborhoods. 180
It will be the task of our contributors to assess the impact of race,
geography, and economic status on the current health care crisis, and to
176. Deborah Chollet et al., Uninsured in the United States: The Nonelderly Population
Without Health Insurance 1988 (Employee Benefit Research Institute 1990).
177. Sylvia Drew Ivie noted in 1980 that
[p]ublic hospitals are the primary providers of care for inner-city poor minorities.
These facilities are grossly underfunded. A shrinking municipal tax base and the
astronomical inflation in health care cost [sic] have left large urban public hospitals
in financial crisis. Local governments have responded by cutbacks in dollars and full
or partial closure of many public hospitals.
Ivie, supra note 168, at 305-06 (footnote omitted); see also AMERICAN PUB. HEALTH ASS'N,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PUB. GEN. HOSPITALS, reprinted in U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 168, at 820-22 (discussing the current problems confronting public general hospitals, including overcrowding).
178. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HOMELESSNESS, HEALTH, AND HUMAN NEEDS
92 (1988):
Under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35), federal financial
support both for community-based health and specialized maternal and child health
care centers was substantially reduced. A number of localities closed or consolidated
facilities. Many health centers, public and private, were forced to reduce their budgets and services.
179. See, eg., SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND THE ENV'T, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, H.R. DOC. No. 126, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 530-44 (1982) (documenting a significant increase in the number of private hospitals that closed or relocated in 52 metropolitan
areas, despite continuing need for medical services, and demonstrating a correlation between
closures and the percentage of African Americans in the affected communities); Ivie, supra
note 168, at 297-300; see also NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1338 (3d Cir.
1981) (upholding decision that the relocation of medical facilities from the inner city to the
outlying suburbs did not violate federal civil rights laws); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 620-21
(2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the closure of an inner-city hospital serving 98% minorities did
not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 905
(E.D. Mo. 1979) (holding that closure of one city hospital and the consolidation of services at a
second city hospital did not violate the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution or federal civil rights legislation). See generally Watson, supra note 174, at 940
(stating that "[w]hile Title VI ended most blatant forms of health care discrimination, subtle
barriers still prevent minorities from gaining full access to federally-funded hospitals and other
health care facilities"); Note, MaintainingHealth Care in the Inner City: Title VI and Hospital
Relocations, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 271, 273-79 (1980) (discussing "runaway" hospitals and the
effects of relocation).
180. As one leading advocate for African-American health care has noted, "private physicians shun the practice of medicine in poor minority communities and, like hospitals, relocate
as the proportion of minorities in an area increases. In the last few decades, ghettos and barrios have shown a steep decline in the number of physicians available to treat inner-city resi-
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identify the most promising strategies to provide adequate health care for
urban and minority populations during coming decades.
E.

Housing in 1992: Scarce, Expensive, and Segregated

Chief among housing issues addressed by the Kerner Commission in
1968 was the issue of housing quality, primarily the prevalence of "substandard housing and general urban blight" in black residential areas. 8"
The Commission stressed that large percentages of urban nonwhites lived
in "housing units classified as deteriorating, dilapidated, or lacking full
plumbing in 1960. " 182 The Report also noted greater overcrowding
among nonwhite units,'8 3 and it offered evidence that a higher proportion of nonwhites paid at least 35% of their incomes for housing in many
cities.' 84 To remedy these deficiencies, the Commission proposed to increase housing production sharply for low-income citizens, with a target
of six million new units in the 1968-1973 period, and to increase antidiscrimination activities to give urban minorities more housing options
85
outside the central cities.'

The ensuing twenty-five years have seen a broad deterioration in the
housing plight of many low-income residents, especially minority residents. Several trends, however, are positive: housing quality arguably
dents." Ivie, supra note 168, at 301 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-266, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 496667 (1976)).
Another commentator affirms this observed relationship between race and poor health
care access:
African American communities in both inner city and rural areas are more likely to
face significant geographic barriers to health care and health care providers. In a
1985 survey, one-third of the 750 American counties with the highest proportion of
African American population were designated by the federal government as "critical
shortage areas" for primary care physicians.
CASSANDRA

Q.

BuTrrs, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BARRIERS OF ACcESS TO PRIVATE HEALTH

CARE FACILrrIES FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS 3 n.3 (1988) (citing Mark Schlesinger, Paying

the Price: Medical Care, Minorities, and the Newly Competitive Health Care System, 65
MILBANK Q. 270, 276 (Supp. II 1987)); see also David A. Kindig et al., Trends in Physician
Availability in 10 Urban Areasfrom 1963 to 1980, 24 INQUIRY 136, 139-42 (1987) (discussing
basic trends in physician availability in both poverty-stricken and non-poverty-stricken areas).
181. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at 467.
182. Id. at 468.
183. Id. at 470.
184. Id. at 471. The Commission noted that African Americans experienced two different
kinds of price discrimination. In some cities, they paid rents that, on average, were similar to
those of whites, but obtained smaller, more deteriorated housing for their money. Id. at 47071. In other cities, they typically were required to pay more in rent to obtain similar housing,
albeit in segregated neighborhoods. Id. at 471.
185. Id. at 474-75.

1332

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

has improved,1 86 and the percentage of poor renters receiving some form
of housing assistance has grown substantially. 8 7 Nonetheless, a shortage

of housing has developed in many low-income housing markets,18 8
brought on by a combination of factors: (1) a sharp slowdown in the
production of new federally-assisted housing during the 1980s; 8 9 (2) the
186. See William C. Apgar, Jr. et al., The State of the Nation's Housing, 1990 JOINT CTR
20.
187. William Apgar reports the following data:
According to the 1987 American Housing Survey, 4.3 million households resided in
public housing or rental housing otherwise subsidized by federal, state or local governments. While growth in the number of subsidized households has slowed since
the mid-1980s, the 1987 figure is up nearly 95 percent from the 2.2 million posted in
1974.
Much of the increase in housing assistance in the last 15 years has gone to aid
households at the lowest end of the income distribution. Among the very poor (incomes less than 50 percent of the poverty threshold), 919,000 (or 34 percent) received housing assistance in 1987, compared with only 225,000 (or 17 percent) in
1974. Among poor renters with incomes between 50 percent and 100 percent of the
poverty threshold, the increase was more modest, rising from 681,000 (or 23 percent)
in 1974 to 1,370,000 (or 33 percent) in 1987.
Id. at 21-22.
Figures compiled for HUD tell a similar story. In 1989, there were 33,767,000 renter
households nationwide, of which 41%, or 13,808,000, were income-eligible for federally assisted housing. Of those 13.8 million, 4,070,000 (or 29%) received some form of federal housing assistance from HUD; 9,738,000 households, or over 70%, did not. CONNIE H. CASEY,
OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEv., CHARACTERISTiCS OF HUD-ASsISTED RENTERs AND THEIR UNITS IN 1989 21 tbl. 1 (1992) [hereinafter
HUD-AssISTED RETrERS]. According to Apgar, over 3.2 million households below the poverty line in 1990 received neither federal housing assistance nor income assistance. Apgar et
al., supra note 186, at 22.
In addition to rental assistance, approximately one million low-income homeowners also
received federal assistance, bringing the total number of low-income renters and homeowners
assisted to 5.4 million in fiscal 1988. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CURRENT HOUSING
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE FEDERAL RESPONSES 37 (1988).
188. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities explained the shortage in stark numerical
terms:
" In 1970, the number of low rent units was 9.7 million. This was approximately
2.4 million greater than the number of low income renter households [defined as
households with incomes of $10,000 a year or less].
* Between 1970 and 1978, there was a slight decline in the number of low cost units
and a modest increase in the number of low income renter households. Despite
these changes, there were still 370,000 more low-cost units than low income households in 1978.
* By 1985, however, there were 3.7 million fewer low rent units than there were low
income renter households-1 1.6 million renter households but just 7.9 million
low rent units.
FOR HOUSING STUDIES AT HARV. U.

PAUL A. LEONARD ET AL., A PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE CRISIS IN HOUSING FOR THE

POOR 6 (1989).
189. The number of newly constructed units added to the federally-assisted inventory never
exceeded 10% of the annual total recommended by the Kerner Commission. In fact, the
number of public housing units declined from 41,249 new units made available for occupancy
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disappearance of approximately 3.3 million older, low-income rental
units from the private market between 1974 and 1993;19o (3) the wide-

spread gentrification, or upward "recycling" of former lower- and moderate-income dwellings, displacing thousands of low-income tenants; 191

and (4) the accelerating loss of thousands of low-income units built with
during the average year between 1970 and 1979 to 7,181 public housing units started in 1988.
MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, THE ROLE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN A REVITALIZED NATIONAL
HOUSING POLICY 9 (Mass. Inst. Tech. Housing Policy Project ed., 1988). In total, 412,490
new public housing units were developed in the 1970s; only 191,024, fewer than half that total,
became available during the 1980s. Id.
Part of the explanation for the decline in federal production of public housing units stems
from the shift, after 1974, from public housing projects toward construction programs funded
by Section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. The HUD Section 8

program targeted federal funds to private developers who would build or refurbish existing,
but dilapidated dwelling units and rent them to low-income households. During the 1980s,
approximately 383,531 of these "Section 8" units were completed. MICHAEL A. STEGMAN,
MORE HOUSING, MORE FAIRLY: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING 26 tbl. 2 (1991).
An even greater part of the explanation for the decline in public housing stems from
another major change in federal housing policy. During the Reagan years, HUD shifted from
reliance on the construction (or rehabilitation) of additional federally-subsidized units-the
principal housing strategy from 1937 through 1980-to the provision of HUD-financed certificates and "vouchers," redeemable as cash rental assistance in the private housing market. As
the Congressional Budget Office reported in 1988:
The production-oriented approach in rental programs has been sharply curtailed in
recent years in favor of the less costly Section 8 existing-housing and voucher programs. Between 1977 and 1982, commitments through programs for new construction and substantial rehabilitation ranged annually from 53 percent to 73 percent of
the total; since then, however, they have made up one-third or less of all additional
rental commitments.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 187, at 37. As Stegman has reported, "consistent with the [Reagan/Bush] administration's favoring of rental assistance over new construction programs, the number of subsidized housing starts per year dropped by more than 88%,
from 175,000 [in 1979] to less than 21,000 [in 1989]." STEGMAN, MORE HOUSING, MORE
FAIRLY, supra, at 25. Indeed, by 1989, 26% of all HUD-assisted units, or 1,060,000 households, were receiving, not subsidized housing units, but HUD certificates or vouchers. HUDASSISTED RENTERS, supra note 187, at 25 tbl. 3.
Critics have charged that this strategy is inherently unable to assist low-income renters in
"tight" housing markets characterized by acute shortages where the fixed-limit certificates or
vouchers do not generate any new construction and cannot bring renters to the rental levels set
by the private housing market. See DAVID C. SCHWARTZ ET AL., A NEW HOUSING POLICY
FOR AMERICA: RECAPTURING THE AMERICAN DREAM 57 (1988).
190. PHILLIP L. CLAY, AT RISK OF Loss: THE ENDANGERED FUTURE OF LOW-INCOME
RENTAL HOUSING RESOURCES 4 fig. 2.2 (1987).
191. See generally GENTRIFICATION OF THE CITY 178-200 (Neil Smith & Peter Williams
eds., 1986) (describing gentrification in the United States generally and the impact of displacement on indigent individuals); Richard LeGates & Chester Hartman, Displacement, 15
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 207, 211 (1981) (stating that "[t]he conclusions of our report are in
almost total opposition to the HUD view that displacement is a small, common and continual
phenomenon, which seldom presents major problems for displacees and is sometimes beneficial
to them").
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federal subsidies in the 1970s, which in the early 1990s began to be with1 92
drawn by their owners from low-income use.
Simultaneously, as low-income housing units have become more
scarce, incomes among low-income and minority persons have stagnated
or declined. 9 3 Thus, by the mid-1980s low-income families, poorer in
real-dollar terms than similar families had been in 1968, have found
themselves scrambling for shelter in markets characterized by sharply
diminished housing supply and sharply increased housing costs. 194
The consequences have been dramatic: the emergence of a homeless
population numbering in the hundreds of thousands in major cities,19 5
unlike anything experienced in the United States since the depths of the
Great Depression. 196 Homelessness, however, is only the most visible tip
of the new housing crisis; an enormous number of poor families, espe192. See SUBCOMM. ON HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEv., HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING,
FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., PREVENTING THE DISAPPEARANCE
oF LOW-INCOME HOUSING 38-47 (Comm. Print 1988); CLAY, supra note 190, at 11.
193. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES & CTR FOR THE STUDY OF THE STATES,
THE STATES AND THE POOR: How BUDGET DECISIONS IN 1991 AFFECTED LOW INCOME

PEOPLE vii-xiv (Dec. 1991).

194.
Year
1970
1978
1983
1989

No. of Low Rent Units
(under $250 /mo.)
6.8 million
6.0 million
5.9 million
5.5 million

No. of Low
Income Renters
6.4 million
7.6 million
9.7 million
9.6 million

EDWARD B. LAZERE ET AL., A PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE Low INCOME HOUSING CRISIS

CONTINUES 5 fig. 1 (Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities ed., 1991). See generallySCHWARTZ et
al., supra note 189, at 3-64 (summarizing the combined deleterious effects of national housing
trends in the 1980s on lower-income residents).
195. After evaluating data on homeless in the 1980s, Peter Rossi put forward the following
estimates:
The firmest figures are those for the portion of the homeless housed nightly in emergency shelters, numbering about 100,000 in 1984. Depending on which estimate of
the street-to-shelter ratio is chosen, the street homeless are at least equal in number
to the shelter homeless and likely closer to double. Hence, based on available information and reasonable assumptions, the most believable national estimate is that at
least 300,000 people are homeless each night in this country, and possibly as many as
400,000 to 500,000 if one accepts growth rates in the past few years of between 10%
and 20%.
PETER H. ROSSI, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNESS 70 (1989).

196. Rossi notes that
[a]lthough no definitive counts were made during the Great Depression, we can get
some notion of the magnitude of homelessness from the activities of federal relief
agencies: in 1933 the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) housed
125,000 people in its transient camps, and a 1934 survey of social agencies in seven
hundred towns and cities estimated 200,000 homeless.
Id. at 22.
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cially African Americans and Hispanics, now pay unsustainable fractions

of their incomes for rent.97 Overcrowding has also increased in many
cities, as families struggle to avoid the streets, 198 and "shelter children,"
the denizens of huge, warehouse-like facilities or dead-end welfare hotels,
are now a common feature of many cities. 19 9

Moreover, the absolute number of households receiving some form
of federal housing assistance grew between 1979 and 19 8 7 ,10 as of 1987
more than 70% of all renters below the poverty line received no federal
housing assistance at all, either through access to public housing or
through federal housing subsidies.2 "1 During the Reagan years, furthermore, federal appropriations for low-income housing suffered an 80%
decline in budget authorization-the greatest decline endured by any major federal program.2 "2 The impact of these housing trends has been especially severe among the black and Hispanic urban poor. One study

noted that in 1985, "half of all poor Hispanic and black households spent
more than 57 percent of their income for housing," and "37 percent of
poor black households-or 1.1 million households-paid at least 70 per197. "Some 18 percent of all Black and Hispanic households paid at least 50 percent of
their income for housing in 1989, compared with nine percent of all White households."
LAZERE et al., supra note 194, at 62. These figures are down from 1985, when 22% of black
households, 20% of Hispanic households, and 10% of white households paid at least 50% of
their incomes for housing. LEONARD et al., supra note 188, at 50.
198. "In 1989, eight percent of poor households-or approximately one million poor
households-lived in overcrowded quarters." LAZERE et al., supra note 194, at 24. Overcrowding is most common among poor renters, and most severe among Hispanics: 26% of
poor Hispanic households are overcrowded, compared with 9% of poor black households and
4% of poor white households. Id.
199. See ALEX KoTLoWrrz, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF TwO
BOYS GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA (1991) (describing two young black children
growing up in large, high-rise, public housing project); see also JONATHAN KOZOL, RACHEL

AND HER CHILDREN: HOMELESS FAMILIES IN AMERICA (1988) (providing harrowing accounts of homeless families with children).
200. The total number of renter households receiving federal housing assistance grew from

2.7 million in 1979 to 4.3 million in 1988, representing a growth from 22% to 29% of eligible
renter households that received federal housing assistance. LAZERE et al., supra note 194, at
24. Since the number of poor families increased substantially during the 1980s, however, a
larger number of eligible households (5.5 million) received no federal assistance in 1987 than in
1979 (4.0 million). Id.
201. Id. at 21-22.
202. See John 0. Calmore, To Make Wrong Right: The Necessary andProperAspirationsof
FairHousing, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1989, at 77, 83 (Janet Dewart ed., 1989)

("During the 1980s authorized funds for federal housing programs have plummeted almost 80
percent ...from the $30 billion authorized for fiscal year 1981 to the $7.17 and $7.3 billion
authorized respectively for fiscal years 1988 and 1989.") (citation omitted).
Between fiscal year 1977 and 1980, the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development made commitments to provide rental assistance to an average of 316,000 additional households per year. LEONARD et al., supra note 188, at 23. Between 1981 and 1988,
the number of new commitments dropped from 316,000 to 82,000 per year. Id.
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cent of their income for housing costs."20 3
Beyond the problems of housing availability and affordability, continued racial discrimination remains a serious impediment even for urban

African Americans who can afford to pay higher housing costs. As
George Galster reported in 1977:
Despite 1968 federal civil rights law, housing discrimination
clearly persisted in 1977, and was likely responsible for a significant portion of the extent and pattern of racial segregation observed in metropolitan areas where it was present. If, for
example, housing discrimination were eliminated in SMSAs
where it was present in both housing tenure markets, the results
lead one to predict that ... white exposure to blacks would
increase by 45 percent, black exposure to whites would increase
by 38 percent, and relative black centralization would decrease
by 26 percent in these areas. 2"
Subsequent analyses continue to show very high levels of residential segregation,20 5 and the available evidence indicates that a substantial percentage of this segregation is not the product of private choice or income
disparities between whites and blacks, but rather of illegal discrimination
against African-American buyers or renters,20 6 not only by sellers and
landlords, but also by mortgage lenders and insurers.2 0 7
203. EDWARD B. LAZERE & PAUL A. LEONARD, THE CRISIS IN HOUSING FOR THE
POOR: A SPECIAL REPORT ON HISPANICS AND BLACKS 1-2 (1989). Since some 35% of all

black households were poor in 1985, this extremely heavy housing burden was shared widely
in the African-American community. Even taking into account both poor and nonpoor
blacks, some 42% of all black households paid at least 30% of their income for housing. Id. at
4. Among all white households, the comparable figure in 1985 was 27%. Id.
204. George C. Galster, More than Skin Deep: The Effect ofHousing Discriminationon the
Extent and PatternofRacial ResidentialSegregation in the United States, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 119, 133-34 (John M. Goering ed., 1986).
205. See, eg., Nancy A. Denton & Douglas S. Massey, Residential Segregation of Blacks,
Hispanics, and Asians by Socioeconomic Status and Generation, 69 SOC. Sci. Q. 797 passim

(1988); John E. Farley, Segregation in 1980: How SegregatedAre America's MetropolitanAreas?, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION 95,
99-109 (Gary A. Tobin ed., 1987); George C. Galster & W. Mark Keeney, Race, Residence,
Discrimination,and Economic Opportunity: Modeling the Nexus of Urban RacialPhenomena,
24 URB. Arr. Q. 87, 92-93, 101-04, 107-09 (1988).
206. See, eg., RONALD E. WIENK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URB. DEV., MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING MARKETS: THE HOUSING MARKET

PRACTICES SURVEY 52-112, 118-74, 177-87 (1979); George C. Galster, Residential Segregation in American Cities: A Contrary Review, 7 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REV. 93, 103-08

(1988); John Yinger, The 1989 Housing Discrimination Study: Results and Implications, in
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 134, passim.
207. See generallyGeorge C. Galster, The Use of Testers in InvestigatingMortgage Lending
andInsuranceDiscrimination,in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 134,passim
(reviewing various studies that found apparent lending and/or credit discrimination through
the use of "testers"); Ronald E. Wienk, Discriminationin Urban Credit Markets: What We
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Discrimination has taken forms other than resistance to integration
in the private sale and rental market. In many urban areas, the public
housing stock often is comprised of large, aging, racially segregated
"housing projects"20 8 that exemplify urban decay: dangerous, crime-ridden, squalid, and physically defaced.20 9 Critics have questioned sharply
Don't Know and Why We Don't Know It, 3 HOUSING PoL'Y DEBATE 217, 237 (1992) (reviewing methodological limitations of prior studies and concluding: "Does housing credit discrimination exist? Yes. Is the behavior of prospective buyers affected by discrimination? Yes.
What do we know about credit discrimination and its effects? Very little."); William Dedman,
The Color of Money, ATLANTA CONST., May 1, 1988, at IA, 14A-16A; May 2, 1988, at IA,
4A-6A; May 3, 1988, at IA, 14A-16A; May 4, 1988, at IA, 8A-10A (documenting racial
disparities in credit and lending policies by Georgia banks).
208. Public housing programs have long served African Americans in greater percentages
than their proportion of the income-eligible population; currently, blacks comprise 53% of
public housing tenants, although they represent only 28% of the income-eligible renters.
HUD-AssISTED RENTERS, supra note 187, at 5. The Department of Housing and Urban Development and local public housing authorities have funded or operated these housing programs on a racially segregated basis in many areas of the country. See, ag., United States v.
Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1184-1216 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1055
(1988); Jaimes v. Lucas Metro. Hous. Auth., 833 F.2d 1203, 1205-06 (6th Cir. 1987); NAACP
v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 151-52 (1st Cir. 1987); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 732-33 (7th Cir. 1971); Young v. Pierce, 640 F. Supp. 1476, 1477-83 (E.D.
Tex. 1986),judgment vacated, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Walker v. United States
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 734 F. Supp. 1231, 1232-46 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (violation of
consent decree). See generally Mittie Olion Chandler, Public Housing Desegregation: What
Are the Options?, 3 HOUSING PoL'Y DEBATE 509, 513-14 (1992) (arguing that the federal
government has perpetuated and sustained segregation in housing at least until the landmark
decision of Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)); Elizabeth K. Julian & Michael M. Daniel,
SEPARATE and UNEQUAL-The Root and Branch of Public Housing Segregation, 23
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 666, 667-68 (1989) (discussing the disparity in living conditions between black and white public housing developments); Florence Wagman Roisman & Philip
Tegeler, Improving and Expanding Housing Opportunitiesfor Poor People of Color: Recent
Developments in Federaland State Courts, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 312, 329-36 (1990) (discussing public housing cases in which racial discrimination was found); Craig Flournoy &
George Rodrigue, Separate and Unequal: Illegal Segregation Pervades Nation's Subsidized
Housing, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 10, 1985, at IA, 24A-29A; Feb. 11, 1985, at IA,
14A-17A; Feb. 12, 1985, at IA, 8A-10A; Feb. 13, 1985, at 1A,14A-17A; Feb. 14, 1985, at 1A,
20A-24A; Feb. 15, 1985, at IA, 16A-19A; Feb. 16, 1985, at 1A,20A-22A; Feb. 17, 1985, at
1A, 26A-27A, reprinted in Discriminationin FederallyAssisted Housing Programs: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance,and Urban Affairs, PartI, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 22-60 (1985-1986) (detailing
findings of a fourteen-month investigation of racial segregation in public housing projects).
209. See generally KOTLOWITZ, supra note 199, at 21-26 (describing the pathetic conditions at the Henry Homer Hanes public housing project in Chicago, Illinois). According to a
recent, comprehensive study of HUD-assisted renters:
Public housing units ...were located more frequently than other [federally] assisted
units or income-eligible, unassisted renters near buildings vandalized or with their
interiors exposed (9 percent), near buildings with bars on windows (11 percent), and
in neighborhoods with trash, litter, or junk on streets or properties (32 percent).
HUD-ASSISTED RENTERS, supra note 187, at 18. The data that accompany the HUD report
indicate some marked differences between central-city and suburban residents of federally assisted housing units. For example, 522,000 of 2,275,000 central-city units nationwide (23.9%)
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both the original rationale and current viability of the older, large central-city projects and have urged the construction of far smaller and more
spatially dispersed replacement units. 210 Yet, when additional construc-

tion funds have been available, local housing authorities often have encountered fierce resistance to the siting of new housing projects outside

traditional low-income and minority areas. 211 Thus, very-low-income
tenants of urban public and assisted housing find themselves tightly bottled in low-income, high-crime areas, unable to leave because of the ab-

sence of assisted housing options in the broader metropolitan areas in
which they reside.
Our contributors, after assessing the current housing burdens faced

by urban black families and urban dwellers generally, will recommend

housing strategies for the coming decades. Are massive new construction programs feasible, given the enormous federal deficit? If so, what
kinds of housing should be funded, and where should it be built? If

large-scale new construction programs are infeasible, what kind of housing assistance should be afforded, and who will pay for it? What should
be the future role of community-based housing development corporations
and community development corporations, which have assumed such an
important role during the past decade of federal neglect?2 12 If mobility is
to be encouraged, is it feasible to expand the Gautreaux model to a nareport a problem with neighborhood crime; among suburban units, only 125,000 of 1,028,000
(12.1%) had similar complaints. Id. app. III, at 16 tbl. 1-8.
Despite such impressions, which understandably have been seared into the public mind by
crime-ridden, high-rise public housing projects such as Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis or Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, not all public housing projects share these horrific characteristics. Only
one-third of the nation's 1,360,000 public housing units are in buildings of 50 units or more.
Fully 18% are in single-family buildings; 30% are in buildings holding two to nine families;
and an additional 20% are in buildings comprised often to forty-nine units. Id. at 14. Indeed,
73% of all those public housing tenants who had moved within one year prior to the Casey
survey stated that public housing gave them a better home (and 44%, a better neighborhood),
than the ones in which they previously had resided. Id. at 20.
210. See THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED
PUBLIC HOUSING: A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT 78-79, 83, 87 (1992).

211. See, e.g., United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 447-52 (2d Cir. 1989) (dis-

cussing contempt proceedings against the City of Yonkers and white city council members
who refused to permit construction to go forward, despite federal court order, because of
strong community opposition by white citizens), rev'd in part sub nom. Spallone v. United
States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1191-93,
1218-22, 1236-37 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding lower court findings of racial discrimination in
prior public housing sitting decisions and approving order to plan construction of subsidized
housing units in racially integrated neighborhoods), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
212. See, e.g., CHARLES E. DAYE ET AL., HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
179-87, 331-32 (1989).
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tional scale,213 and if so, what kinds of governmental support should be
provided to suburban apartment-seekers? Should housing assistance be
tied to a coherent urban economic development policy? If so, what
should it be?
F

Welfare in 1993: Still a Morass

The Kerner Commission undertook a broad examination of public
welfare issues in 1968, explaining that "[t]he burden of welfare-and the
burden of the increases [in welfare recipient case rolls]-will fall princi' and that "our present system of public
pally on our central cities," 214

assistance contributes materially to the tensions and social disorganization that have led to civil disorders. The failures of the system alienate
the taxpayers who support it, the social workers who administer it, and
the poor who depend on it."2' 15
The Commission identified several critical deficiencies in the welfare
system in 1968: first, its exclusion from coverage of many who needed
benefits; second, its provision of "assistance well below the minimum
necessary for a decent level of existence"; and third, its "restrictions that
encourage continued dependency on welfare and undermine self' 216
respect.
The Report observed that, under America's piecemeal 'approach to
income assistance, only about a third of the 21.7 million nonelderly poor
in 1966 received some form of major public welfare assistance; most of
those recipients were children and mothers covered by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. 2 7 State AFDC programs in 1968 typically excluded two-parent families, regardless of
whether those families had incomes below the poverty line. Moreover,
the total federal aid provided under the AFDC program was only two
billion dollars a year, or about $36 per month for each recipient. AFDC
payments were subject to wide state-by-state variations, from an average
of $9.30 per month in Mississippi to $62.55 in New York.2 18 Finally, the
Commission pointed to a number of harsh regulations adopted by most
state programs-including a requirement of a year's residence prior to
welfare eligibility, a deduction in welfare payments for any amounts
213. For a discussion of the Gautreaux experiment, see supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.

214.

KERNER COMM'N REPORT,

supra note 15, at 458.

215. Id. at 457.
216. Id.

217. Id. at 458-59; see Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 62729 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-606 (1988)).
218. KERNER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 15, at 458.

1340

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

earned by welfare recipients, and the precondition that at least one parent be absent from the home (the so-called "absent father rule")-all of
which tended to demean welfare recipients in their own, and the public's,
eyes.

2 19

To address these deficiencies, the Commission proposed a variety of
responses, including: (1) a commitment by the federal government to
provide "more adequate levels of assistance on the basis of uniform national standards"; 220 (2) the extension of welfare payments to a far
broader range of potential recipients-at a minimum, two-parent families
with children;2 21 and (3) the development of job training, day care centers, and other programs to enhance the self-reliance of welfare
recipients.2 22

The subsequent history of welfare policy is complex, since the nation
has not adopted the Kerner Commission's recommendation to nationalize AFDC standards, and thus wide variations in state benefit levels and
a welter of overlapping programs remain. Nonetheless, some overall
trends are discernable. Between the mid-1960s and early 1970s there was
an increase in the nation's AFDC population from 3.1 million recipients
in 1960 to 10.8 million by 1974; one commentator described the increase
as an "explosion. "223 By the mid-1980s, this increase had prompted
some to contend that AFDC was contributing to the perpetuation of a
new welfare class, especially among the minority poor, who were being
seriously deterred from entering the labor market by the receipt of welfare assistance.2 24 Yet, the number of persons receiving AFDC payments
remained virtually constant after 1975; indeed, the number actually declined slightly between 1975 and 1989.221 Moreover, the earlier expansion in AFDC caseloads was not accompanied by a similar increase in
benefits:
[S]pending on cash assistance programs has gone through several distinct phases ....From 1960 to 1973 there was a quintupling of federal, state, and local spending on AFDC, as average
benefit levels rose and participation in the program mounted.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 461-63.
Id. at 462-63.
Id. at 463-64.
223. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 171.
224. See LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP 69-90 (1986); MURRAY, supra note 76, at 149-53, 162-64 (1984). Contra William

Julius Wilson et al., Joblessness versus Welfare Effects: A FurtherReexamination, in TRULY
DISADVANTAGED, supra note 18, at 93, 93-106.
225. The total number of AFDC recipients declined from 11,404,000 in 1975 to 11,183,000
in 1989. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 102, No. 612, at 372.
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Real spending on AFDC rose again in 1975 and 1976 in response to the severe 1974-75 recession. But since 1976 AFDC
outlays have fallen substantially. In the eight years after 1976
real outlays declined by 20 percent, as nominal benefit levels
failed to keep pace with the rate of inflation and, more recently,
as eligibility limits were tightened.2 26
Thus while total AFDC payments, measured in absolute dollar terms,
have increased substantially,2 27 the per capita increases have been far less

significant.228 When adjusted for inflation, the maximum AFDC benefit
for a family of three with no other income actually declined 42% between 1970 and 1991, and the average AFDC family of three received an
income no more than 42% of the poverty line.2 29
Of course, since the mid-1960s a number of important noncash pro2 30
grams have been created or expanded to help low-income recipients,
including the Food Stamp program,23 x the Medicaid program discussed
earlier,2 32 nutritional programs such as the School Lunch Program,2 33
and the supplemental food program for women, infants, and children
(WIC). 234 There is debate on the net impact of these newer programs on

the poor, and on whether the traditional calculations of the poverty line,
which exclude these noncash benefits,235 provide an accurate indicator of
226. Gary Burtless, PublicSpendingfor the Poor: Trends, Prospects,andEconomic Limits,
supra note 8, at 18, 21 (citations omitted).
227. Total federal and state contribution grew from $4.85 billion in 1970 to $17.47 billion
in 1989. STATISTICAL ABsTRACT, supra note 102, No. 613, at 372.
228. Average monthly AFDC payments, unadjusted for inflation, increased by an average
of just over $10 per year during the 15 years from 1975 through 1989, rising from $229 to
$383. Id. No. 612, at 372.
229. CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 193, at 8.
230. Federal dollars spent on Food Stamps rose from $550 million in 1970 to $11.68 billion
in 1989. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 102, No. 610, at 370. Expenditures on the
school lunch program have risen from $300 million to $3 billion between 1970 and 1989; on
the school breakfast program, from $11 million to $512 million; and on the WIC program
from $603 million to $1.55 billion between 1980 and 1989. Id.
231. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2032 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
232. Compare supra note 172 and accompanying text (noting the overall increase in Medicaid availability to low-income blacks) with supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (acknowledging that, despite the increase in Medicaid availability, a significant percentage of the
black population is still without health care coverage of any sort).
233. National School Lunch Act of 1946, ch. 281, 60 Stat. 230 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1751-1766, 1769 (1988 & Supp. II. 1990)).
234. Pub. L. No. 89-642, § 17, amended by Pub. L. No. 92-433, § 9, 86 Stat. 724, 729
(1972), (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
235. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No. 182-RD,

in FIGHTING POVERTY,

CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, MEASURING THE EFFECT OF BENEFITS AND TAXES ON
INCOME AND POVERTY: 1979 TO 1991 app. A, at A1-2 (1992) [hereinafter MEASURING THE

EFFECT] (discussing the origin and development of various federal poverty formulas); see also
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the actual plight of poor persons who receive such benefits.23 6
The most recent federal response to the "welfare problem" has been
the Family Support Act of 1988.237 This legislation was ostensibly
designed to encourage AFDC recipients to obtain education or job train-

ing, and then to become economically self-sufficient by entering the job
market. 23 8 The actual impact of the Act, however, is not yet clear,

although some of its basic assumptions are subject to serious question.239
PATRICIA RUGGLES, DRAWING THE LINE 139-46 (1990) (arguing that even though inclusion
of noncash benefits will lower poverty rates at any given time, the inclusion of these benefits
will not cause alterations in the long-term trends of poverty rates); Mollie Orshansky, Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile, 28 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 3, 3 (1965) (providing analysis of the poverty line, adjusting for variable family situations).
236. See, eg., MEASURING THE EFFECT,supra note 235, at vii-xxiv (discussing 15 alternative formulas for measuring income); Danziger & Weinberg, supra note 118, at 8-11. Danziger
and Weinberg note that the current poverty threshold measures used by the Office of Management and Budget are derived from measures developed by Mollie Orshansky in the early
1960s, based upon a calculation of "the income necessary to provide minimally decent levels of
consumption." Id. at 9.
The thresholds became linked with the food component of the Consumer Price Index in
the late 1960s when OMB adopted the Orshansky measure as a government standard for determining poverty and tied it to the Consumer Price Index to account for inflation. Id. Possible
future alterations to poverty measures include taking into account the impact of taxes, regional
variations in income needs, and the receipt of non-cash and in-kind benefits (such as Food
Stamps and subsidized housing assistance) that presently are not considered. Id. at 12-14.
Some have insisted that the percentage of households that are poor is currently overstated
because of the omission of Food Stamps and other noncash benefits from the poverty calculation. See, e.g., U.S. Senate Statement, Data Collection and Poverty Level, reprintedin MEASURING THE EFFECT, supra note 235, app. G, at G1. Isaac Shapiro and Robert Greenstein
note that the reduction in the inflation-adjusted value of AFDC benefits has been so great
during the 1970-1991 period that "the average value of AFDC and food stamp benefits combined has now fallen to about the same level as the value of AFDC benefits alone in 1960,
before the food stamp program was created." ISAAC SHAPIRO & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, SELECTIVE PROSPERITY: INCREASING INCOME DISPARITIES SINCE 1977, at 13 (1991).
237. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26
U.S.C.).
238. One Senator who led the legislative reform effort described its intentions as follows:
Under the newly reformed welfare system, the presumption is that the family should
and can be self-supporting .... [T]o the maximum extent that resources can be
found .... aid will be coupled with the tools-education, training, child care and
other services-needed to assure that dependence on public aid will be a temporary
condition leading to restored self sufficiency....
...
[T]he major elements of [the Family Support] Act [of 1988] were all designed to
serve the same overall purpose-a redirection of our welfare system in ways that
would help recipients attain self-sufficiency.
Lloyd Bentsen, Reforming the Welfare System: The Family Support Act of 1988, 16 J. LEGIS.
133, 134, 137 (1990).
239. See generally Timothy J. Casey, The Family Support Act of 1988: Molehill or Mountain, Retreat or Reform?, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 930, 931 (1989) ("The FSA's basic aim is
to reduce sharply the number of families receiving AFDC, although the measures adopted
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Moreover, some argue that the continuing policy emphasis on "welfare"
and AFDC is misplaced, since most poor and minority families are not
on AFDC, but instead are struggling in minimum-wage or part-time jobs
that simply do not pay enough to lift them from poverty. 2"
One conclusion is clear: None of the three major recommendations
of the Kerner Commission has yet been adopted. Millions of poor Americans remain ineligible for public assistance. There are no minimum national standards for AFDC recipients, and no state provides benefits that
lift recipients above the poverty line. Most states withdraw Medicaid
coverage and AFDC payments from AFDC recipients who enter the
work force, perpetuating the financial disincentives to self-reliance that
the Kerner Commission identified in 1968.
It falls to our contributors to assess the successes and failures of
current public benefits programs, to chart their impact on the urban
poor, especially African Americans, and to make proposals for the
future.
G. Black PoliticalPower: Major PoliticalGains, FormidablePractical
Challenges
In no area has black progress during the past twenty-five years been

more dramatic than in the attainment of urban political power. Aided in
the South by passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965241 and in the
North and West by the changing demographics forecast by the Kerner
Commission, African Americans have captured mayors' offices, school
superintendents' offices, and other local power bases in dozens of major
cities, including New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia,
Washington, Newark, Baltimore, Atlanta, Birmingham, New Orleans,
and Denver.2 42
This greater political control by urban blacks has led to significant
toward this end will almost certainly fail to achieve it and are even less likely to reduce childhood poverty rates significantly.").
240. See, eg., DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 232 (1988); see also THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 35-46, 96-104 (1990) (discussing
means-tested programs and social insurance programs).
241. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-4 (1988)). For a discussion of black electoral gains, see COMMON DESTINY, supra
note 18, at 230-38.
242. See Georgia A. Persons, Racial Politics and Black Power in the Cities, in BLACK AND
WHITE, supra note 18, at 166, 173-76. In 1970, the nationwide total of black elected legislators
at the federal and state level was 179, with only 719 in elected city and county offices. STATIsTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 102, No. 447, at 266. By 1989, the number of black federal and
state legislators had more than doubled, to 441, while the number of elected city and county
officials had increased sixfold, to 4,388. Id.
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gains in municipal employment for African Americans, "much in the
same way earlier ethnic groups, such as the Irish, took advantage of the
benefits of office." '24 3 Improved employment opportunities for urban
blacks has not been limited to the law enforcement sector. For example,
by 1987, 43% of all employees of the City of Cleveland were black, as
were 47% of all employees of the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Authority, 73% of all employees of the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing
Authority, and 52% of the more than 10,000 people employed by the
Cleveland Board of Education. 2" Such numbers were unheard of twenty
years ago when, according to Norman Krumholz, "none of these agen'2 45
cies even had an affirmative action plan.
Yet black political power, by and large, has not led to other major
economic or social gains for the minority poor in these cities. Professor
Gary Orfield and Carole Ashkinaze recently have offered a comprehensive look at Atlanta, Georgia, where two decades of exuberant metropolitan job growth and black political leadership might have been expected
to bring dramatic improvement to Atlanta's minority poor. Instead,
Orfield and Ashkinaze report, the continued geographic segregation of
Atlanta-a black central city surrounded by white suburbs, and by separate and unequal black suburbs-has led to the development and expansion of a "dual market," in which most of the good jobs, the good

schools, and the better neighborhoods continue to be reserved for suburban whites, with Atlanta's inner-city, predominantly black population
left farther and farther behind.2 46
Orfield and Ashkinaze attribute these failures in part to inaction by
Atlanta's black political leaders:
Local observers describe[ ] a kind of celebratory politics, where
black middle-class leaders took the evidence of their own success as proof of progress and many low-income blacks accepted
that [success] as proof of the possibilities within the system ....
The Atlanta style may be typical of the actual experience of
blacks governing cities, as one black scholar wrote in 1990:
".... these governments... have generally pursued policies of
fiscal conservatism and downtown development, coupled with
policies and programs of minority appointments and employment, contracts to minority businesses, and efforts to restrain
243. Krumholz, supra note 109, at 28. In 1967, for example, 7.4% of Cleveland's police
force was black, compared to 28.1% in 1990. The comparable gains for African Americans in
Detroit are 5.2% to 53.7%; for Newark, 9.8% to 47.1%; and for Oakland, 4.1% to 45.6%.
THE URBAN INSTITUTE, CONFRONTING THE NATION'S URBAN CRISIS 9 tbl. 1 (1992).

244. Krumholz, supra note 109, at 28-29.
245. Id. at 29.
246. ORFIELD & ASHKINAZE, supra note 113, at 17-23.
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police misconduct in minority communities."'2 47
Yet Orfield and Ashkinaze are quick to observe that city officials in
Atlanta and elsewhere typically lack real power to address many of the
root problems that afflict the urban poor:

Local government is not nearly so powerful as state government, federal government, or the private sector in affecting
broad social, economic, and educational problems. Local government controls limited resources and struggles every year to
maintain existing staff and services. Cutting city budgets
means cutting into the black middle class since city government
tends to hire much larger proportions of blacks than other large
employers. Much of the discretionary money that used to fund
new programs came from federal grants that fell sharply in the
1980s. Some critical programs, such as job training, were
turned over to state government. Many of the programs cannot
be solved, at any rate, within the boundaries of a single local
government.
The institutions and policies that most directly affect the
mobility of young blacks are almost all outside the control of
city leaders. City governments have no control of the suburbs,
where most of the jobs are being created and almost all of the
new housing is developed. The best opportunities for pre-college education are suburban. Educational funding, welfare policy, higher education, job training, and many other critical
issues are decided largely at the state and federal levels, where
suburban power is growing and city influence is shrinking as
population disperses.24 8
Our contributors doubtless will enter this critical debate, asking whether
American municipalities, many of them now under African-American
leadership, have sufficient statutory authority, financial resources, and
political will to make the changes needed by the urban minority poor.
247. Id. at 49-50 (quoting Robert C. Smith, Recent Elections andBlack Politics: The Maturation or Death of Black Politics?, 23 POL. SC. & POL. 160, 161 (1990)).
248. Id. at 24-25. Georgia A. Persons has observed:
The important thing to remember is that the plight of black-mayor cities and their
citizenry is tied to larger economic forces over which African Americans simply have
no control. This is a profound economic reality that frequently drives the political
path pursued by black mayors; and that path may offer only minimal, if any benefits
to the African-American community. Indeed, the demands of governing are frequently very conflicting ones and frequently black mayors in their governing roles
actually serve to reinforce the prevailing economic and social order that they were
expected to aid in changing.

Persons, supra note 242, at 183.
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H. American Cities: Still Central?
David Rusk, former mayor of Albuquerque, New Mexico, recently
has argued that the vitality of American cities is directly correlated with
their degree of economic and racial desegregation:
The "urban problem" at heart is the product of segregationracial, ethnic, economic-not the result of inadequate overall
resources and opportunities.... [T]he crucial determinants are
not overall growth or percentage of minorities but measures of
disparity.
In [the booming] metro areas county governments tend to be
the dominant local government, providing many public services
and often controlling crucial development decisions. Many
such areas also have very large, even county-wide, school

systems.
[T]he underlying dynamic is the same: these metro areas have
avoided segregation by race and economic class better than
others.24 9
Rusk offers statistics comparing the performance of 346 "growing cities,"
71 "stagnant cities," and 101 "declining cities." 2 50° On average, Rusk
notes that growing cities incorporated outlying areas, and grew in total
area by 272% between 1960 and 1990, with an average 1990 size of sixtythree square miles, while declining cities (which had, on average, been
50% larger than growing cities in 1960) grew by only 16%, within an
average size of thirty square miles in 1990.251 Indicia of segregation in
housing and public education were significantly lower in Rusk's growing
cities, with fewer local school districts and municipalities in each metropolitan area, while metropolitan areas in declining cities were far more
politically balkanized.2 52 The implication is that in metropolitan areas
where governmental services are widely shared, residential segregation
declines. Rusk concludes that
an effective urban policy must attempt more than to prop up
249. David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs, NEw DEMOCRAT, May, 1992, at 17, 19; see also
(1993) (elaborating, at greater length, his data and
arguments).
250. David Rusk, Data Prepared for Meeting of the Committee on Economic Development, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 10, 1993) (on file with the author). Growing cities are defined
as those that experienced a population growth rate greater than 10% between 1960 and 1990;
stagnant cities grew 0 to 10%; declining cities lost 0 to 10%. Id.
251. Id
252. For example, the growing cities averaged 25 local governments and 14 local school
districts in 1987; the declining cities averaged 35 school districts and 78 local governments. Id.
DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS
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decaying inner cities; it must address city and suburb together.
It must be broad and visionary: directed toward integrating
city and suburban economies (including tax bases), infrastructure, and educational
systems as strategies for integrating
25 3
communities.
Our contributors will address this proposed remedy and others that
might affect the future economic viability of America's urban areasareas plagued by declining industrial bases, mounting costs for social
services and other municipal functions, and shrinking tax bases as betterpaid workers depart for the suburbs.
III.

CONCLUSION

Because of structural changes in the national economy that have
contributed to the growth of an "urban underclass, 25 4 and the continuing deficiencies in urban educational, health care, housing, and welfare
systems, it is tempting to conclude that most African Americans and all
cities are worse off today than they were when the urban riots broke out
in the late 1960s. Although conditions have worsened demonstrably for
poor African Americans living in drug-plagued inner-city communities,
there is some evidence that the conditions in which a substantial minority
of blacks "live and work have improved in the last thirty years." ' 5 Nor
is all of the nation's poverty in urban areas. In 1989, while 41% of all
poor households lived in central cities, 30% of the poor lived in the suburbs, and 29% lived in nonmetropolitan areas.25 6
Yet the most striking fact about American poverty twenty-five years
after the Kerner Commission Report is its intensifying concentration
within the nation's major cities. Douglas Massey has developed the term

"hypersegregation '"257 to underline the multi-dimensional urban trap in
253. Rusk, supra note 249, at 17.

254. William Julius Wilson has chided liberal academics for their reluctance to employ the
term "underclass" which, Wilson suggests, is symptomatic of a broader reluctance to recognize and address the "heterogeneous grouping of inner-city families and individuals whose
behavior contrasts sharply with that of mainstream America." TRULY DISADVANTAGED,
supra note 18, at 7; see also Erol Ricketts, The Nature and Dimensions of the Underclass, in
BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 18, at 30, 39-53 (evaluating various attempts to define and
measure the contemporary urban "underclass").
255. SMITH & WELCH, supra note 138.
256. F. JOHN DEVANEY, HOUSING IN AMERICA: 1989/90, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

12, 30(1992). While 51% of all families with severe housing deprivations lived in central cities
in 1989, more than one-third (34%) lived in the suburbs and 15% lived in nonmetropolitan
areas.

257. Douglas S. Massey & Mitchell L. Eggers, The Ecology of Inequality: Minoritiesand
the Concentration of Poverty, 1970-1980, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1153, 1180-84 (1990).
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which the minority poor now find themselves. In a recent article, Massey

explained:
In a racially segregated city, any increase in poverty is confined
to a small number of minority neighborhoods; the greater the
segregation, the smaller the number of neighborhoods absorbing the shock, and the more severe the resulting concentration
of poverty. If class segregation is also imposed, then the additional poverty is not only restricted to minority neighborhoods,
it is confined primarily to poor minority neighborhoods.2 5
Massey's work illustrates how race and class isolation extend their collective misery beyond individual households. During virtually any economic downturn such concentration quickly multiplies individual
economic misfortune, producing a community-wide economic and social
depression:
Under conditions of high racial segregation, a rise in the black
poverty rate produces a dramatic loss in potential demand in
poor black neighborhoods, leading to the withdrawal, deterioration, and outright elimination of goods and services distributed through the market. Moreover, to the extent that public
services are dependent on local tax revenues or user fees, they
also disappear or suffer declines in quality.
Because segregation concentrates disadvantage, shifts in
black poverty rates comparable with those observed during the
1970s have the power to transform the socioeconomic character
of poor black neighborhoods very rapidly and dramatically,
changing a low-income black community from a place where
welfare-dependent, female-headed families are a minority to
one where they are the norm, producing high rates of crime,
property abandonment, mortality, and educational failure. All
of these deleterious conditions occur through the joint effect of

rising poverty and high levels of racial segregation. They can
be produced at any time through a simple increase in black
poverty59 rates under conditions prevailing in most large U.S.
2
cities.
Massey adds that white citizens clearly benefit from such residentially segregated systems:
By confining blacks to a small number of segregated neighborhoods, whites insulate themselves from the higher rates of black
poverty and the problems associated with it; and as segregation
rises, the total income of white neighborhoods grows while that
258. Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass, 96 AM. J. Soc. 329, 337 (1990).
259. Id. at 351.
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of black neighborhoods falls, so that whites are in a better position to support hospitals, clinics, and other medical facilities.2"

Is Massey correct that class-based, economic policies designed to
overcome African-American poverty, are doomed to inevitable failure

unless they simultaneously challenge America's all-but-universal patterns
of residential segregation?2 6 ' This perennial question, at the heart of the

Kerner Commission's 1968 report, echoes in the important, ongoing debate reopened in the late 1980s by the writings of William Julius Wil-

son.2 62 It is surely the ultimate question for the Contributors to this
special issue of the North CarolinaLaw Review, and in the end, for the

readers and the nation as well.

260. Id. at 353.
261. Id. at 354.
262. See ANTHONY DowNs, OPENING UP THE SUBURBSpassim (1973) (presenting classic
argument in favor of policies that affirmatively promote residential desegregation); Anthony
Downs, Policy DirectionsConcerningRacialDiscriminationin U.S. HousingMarkets, 3 HoUsING POL'Y DEBATE 685, 739-43 (1992) (concluding reluctantly that, in view of continuing,
widespread public resistance to desegregation policies, policy efforts should be directed toward
reduction of illegal acts of discrimination in housing sales and rental markets). Compare
TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 18, at 140-64 (arguing for a "fundamental shift from the
traditional race-specific approach" toward universal economic programs that draw support
from a wider spectrum of American society) and Theda Skocpol, Targeting within Universal-

ism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in the United States, in URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 106, at 411, 414 (same) with George C. Galster, The Case for Racial
Integration, in BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 18, at 270, 270-82 (insisting that integration
remains a crucial goal of urban policy) and Gary Orfield, Ghettoizationand Its Alternatives, in
THE NENW URBAN REALITY 161, 161-93 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1985) (contending that residential integration is the only serious alternative to continued ghetto formation) and Robert
Greenstein, Universal and Targeted Approaches to Relieving Poverty: An Alternative View, in
URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 106, at 437, 446-50 (arguing that carefully tailored, classspecific, if not race-specific, economic and social policies are politically viable).

